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Abstract 
Harris, Pavla (Ph.D., Sociology) 
Worldwide Patterns and Determinants of National Identity: 
The Varied Influence of Education 
Thesis directed by Professor Fred Pampel 
 
Nationalist attitudes and nationalism have long been of interest to social scientists yet studies 
have been inconclusive on many of their aspects. My research examines national identity from a 
new perspective and provides outlines of relationships that exist between education, national 
identity, economic development in the world, and other country-level characteristics. National 
identity is operationalized in several different ways: first as national pride and a national pride 
scale, then separately as the ethnic and the civic components of national identity, and as 
combined national identity. I also consider additional macro-structural variables: human 
development, democracy, ethnic, linguistic, and religious homogeneity, and the values-related 
variables of levels of self-expression and secularity. I combine the micro and macro approaches 
to national identity by considering individual level characteristics (focusing on education) that 
are associated with national identity, and macro-level ones that might influence how micro-
structural factors determine national identity. I theorize that in developed countries national 
identity decreases with higher levels of education but that in developing countries the levels of 
national identity are higher among the more educated. I use the fifth wave of the World Values 
Survey with 57 countries at all levels of development with data collected in 2005-2008. 
Matching the individual-level survey data with aggregate measures of economic development 
and political and cultural factors allows for multilevel analyses with cross-level interactions that 
link national identity and education in varied societal contexts. The results support my 
hypotheses and suggest that people's national identity is influenced by micro- and macro-
structural factors, and that the levels of economic development, human development, and 
democracy have a facilitating effect on the negative influence of education on national identity 
that pushes this relationship even more into the negative territory for wealthier, more developed 
countries. The results for country-level variables related to culture are mixed but in their majority 
support my hypotheses and are theoretically explainable. Finally, I test my hypotheses by 
examining how people’s education influences preferences for restrictive immigration policies 
across the countries of the world. This is a more practical application of the abstract concepts 
investigated in my dissertation. On the individual level, education decreases the preferences for 
restrictive immigration policies; on the country-level, it increases preferences for restrictive 
immigration policies, and on the micro/macro level higher economic development facilitates the 
negative influence of education on the preferences for restrictive immigration policies. These 
results confirm the links between education, national identity, and attitudes toward immigration. 
More research is needed, especially with regard to cultural factors (e.g., religion) influencing 
national identity on cross-national levels. In addition to the multilevel modeling methods I used 
in my dissertation, I recommend in-depth historical-comparative studies of countries with varied 
national characteristics.
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CHAPTER I ‒ INTRODUCTION 
Literature on nationalism shows that high socioeconomic position and education lower 
national identity and resistance to immigrant groups. Although true for high income nations, 
such generalizations may not apply to developing countries where high-SES and educated people 
tend to lead national movements. Some well-known examples from the past are Mohandas 
(Mahatma) Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru in India. This potential difference in the influence of 
individual characteristics on national identity across countries highlights the effects of economic, 
political, and social context in understanding not only the level of national identity, but also its 
social determinants. 
It is important to study national identity not only for the sake of the theoretical 
understanding of how nations and nationalistic feelings develop but also because national 
identity has profound effects on people’s everyday lives by influencing their policy preferences 
and voting behavior. For example, attitudes toward immigration that stem from varied levels of 
national identity in individuals will influence for whom those individuals will vote in both local 
and national elections depending on candidates’ views and plans for addressing immigration 
issues. This scenario generally applies in developed, industrialized countries or developing 
countries with stable political systems and at least somewhat democratic regimes. In developing, 
typically poorer, countries that tend to be politically less stable the levels of national identity will 
be most important for nation building (discussed in detail later in the theoretical part of this 
chapter) and/or restructuring of the political landscape in differing degrees. In extreme cases 
such restructuring can lead to uprisings and revolutions, as illustrated on the example of the Arab 
Spring in 2011. During that period groups of more educated people that were not a part of 
establishment elites mobilized and attempted, in several instances successfully, to instigate social 
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change and install new governments. These groups of people were mainly comprised of younger 
people with few perspectives for the future (frequently because they were a part of ethnic or 
religious minorities). Research cannot predict when these events would happen or if they would 
be successful, but it can identify the characteristics of the individuals and groups that would be in 
the forefront of the social change efforts. 
Although education has different meanings for nationalist attitudes across the world, 
many studies assume its meaning is the same everywhere. Research often ignores how 
differences between high and low educated groups vary across national contexts. The question 
thus remains as to why SES and education have shifting, even contradictory, influences on 
national identity. 
According to Ernest Renan (1882) national identity includes a shared past and a will to 
share a future on a level of a national community. Smith (1992), obviously drawing on Renan, 
calls this will a "common destiny." Anthony Smith (1991) considers national identity "the 
subjective feelings and valuations of any population that possesses common experiences and one 
or more shared cultural characteristics (usually customs, language or religion)." Both individuals 
and nations vary in the strength of national identity, which has crucial implications for public 
policy on many issues, including immigration. 
My research strives to combine micro and macro approaches to the topic of national 
identity, considering first individual-level characteristics such as socioeconomic position that are 
associated with it, and, second, macro-level ones, such as economic and political development. 
Macro-level factors may, in turn, influence how micro factors determine national identity in the 
respective countries. Examining how groups with varied socioeconomic characteristics and in 
countries with varied levels of economic development differ in their levels of national identity 
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gives insight into how people across the world come to form key social values and related 
political attitudes on topics such as immigration. Existing research usually examines individuals 
within particular countries or the differences in average levels of national identity between 
countries, but not the differences in individual relationships or determinants across countries. To 
answer questions about changing sources of national identity, my study aims to examine these 
differences. 
While there is agreement among scholars that education does influence national identity, 
there has been so far no consensus on the direction of its influence, the levels on which it works 
and the mechanisms that are involved in the processes that cause it. Based on existing theoretical 
approaches and prior empirical studies on various levels of analysis I theorize that in developed 
countries national identity will decrease with higher levels of education, but that in the 
developing countries levels of national identity will be higher among the more educated. Thus 
the theory has a micro-component on how education affects individuals and a macro-component 
on how social and economic development shapes the meaning of education for national identity. 
The theory aims to explain levels of national identity across individuals and nations but also to 
take the relationship between SES and national identity as varying across nations and to 
understand this micro-macro variation. The significance of the effort comes from deepening our 
understanding of how national context shapes the group-based stratification of values, meanings, 
and identities.  
My research tests the theory using combined micro- and macro-level data in a new way. 
It uses the World Values Survey with 57 nations at all levels of development in the fifth wave 
from 2006 to 2008. The data set includes a wide variety of individual measures, but, more 
importantly, it contains a remarkably diverse set of nations. Matching the individual-level survey 
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data with aggregate measures of economic development and cultural and political factors allows 
for multilevel analyses that link national identity and education under varied economic 
conditions. The multilevel model which examines variations within and across nations tests the 
new theory and offers new insights into the sources of different levels and conceptions of 
national identity across the world. 
Theoretical Perspectives 
The main theoretical approaches to the relationships between education and national 
identity can be grouped into micro-structural theories and macro-structural ones. The first group 
considers how the social positions of individuals affect their national identity. The second group 
examines how characteristics of groups and nations affect national identity. 
The micro-structural theories offer two arguments. One set of micro arguments applied to 
developing economic and political nations posits that education increases nationalistic views and 
actions. Another set applied to developed countries posits that high SES and education groups 
are prone to have lower national identity and those with lower SES and education have stronger 
national identity. The macro-structural argument focuses on the national- and macro-level 
characteristics in societies such as modernism, communication, and literacy that affect all people 
in a country. Within the macro-structural approach there are also two sets of arguments: one 
states that economic development increases national identity, the other one claims that it 
decreases it. The combined micro-macro or integrative approach that I have developed focuses 
on how individual and national characteristics jointly influence national identity and how 
national characteristics such as modernism, communication, and literacy change the relationship 
SES and education have with national identity. It helps to make sense of the contrasting micro 
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arguments about the effects of SES and education and the contrasting macro arguments about 
economic development.  
Micro-Structural Approaches to the Relationship between 
Education and National Identity 
Micro-structural approaches to the relationship between education and national identity 
offer competing accounts of why and how education affects national identity. On one hand, 
theories focusing on the emergence of nationalistic movements in past centuries in the West and 
recent decades in the developing world highlight the interests of highly educated persons in 
having nationalistic values. On the other hand, theories focusing on Europe and the West in more 
contemporary periods offer several reasons why high SES and highly educated individuals have 
lower levels of national identity: education increases cognitive skills, education increases post-
materialist values, and educated individuals have economic opportunities that give them an 
advantage in the competition with individuals from other countries and immigrants. 
While all theorists covered in this section assume the importance of membership in a 
dominant/non-dominant group for the feelings of national identity, there are two different sets of 
arguments when it comes to education: The first set claims that education increases national 
identity, the second one that it decreases it. Both approaches support the idea that education is a 
key micro-structural factor regarding national identity; the only disagreement is contextual – 
when/under which conditions does education increase or decrease national identity? Hechter and 
Hroch are more concerned with nationalism in the context of emerging national and political 
development; Inglehart, Bollen and Medrano, and Bonacich focus on economically and 
politically developed nations. 
One of the explanations of how education influences national identity positively on the 
micro-structural level focuses on group solidarity. According to Michael Hechter (1987) 
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individuals identify with a certain national identity or join nationalistic movements because they 
desire private goods; in other words, they are making a rational choice to gain benefits of a group 
identity or membership. Thus group behavior can be explained by rational action of individuals. 
Hechter outlines three conditions that need to be fulfilled for individuals to join such groups; the 
first condition is an interest articulation: people joining a group, in this case a group tied together 
by nationalistic interests, must be aware they have common interests and must be able to get 
together and articulate those interests. The second condition assumes constitutional choice: 
procedure to make decisions must be established and that is easier for culturally homogenous 
groups. Thirdly, the production and allocation of the joint good must be addressed: there must be 
resources available, a process how to get them established, and a system of distribution in place. 
In the case of nationalism and national identity, the first two points are quite obvious: nationalist 
groups and parties exist and they have bylaws and administrative procedures in place. The third 
condition is less intuitive and less tangible: the results of a nationalist movement can be 
government positions (political), administrative jobs, physical security, access to food supplies, 
and benefits and advantages available exclusively to certain groups of people and decreed by the 
government (e.g., special treatment for ethnically "pure" Germans in Germany as opposed to 
naturalized Germans). 
Considering national identity and relating to my research I draw from Hechter that, for 
members of dominant groups, increased SES and educational levels enable people to get 
substantial benefits concerning jobs and income, and so their membership in nationalist groups 
might not seem as appealing. When the most educated group does not have the opportunity to 
realize the full benefits of its levels of education, however, education increases national identity 
as a means to gain access to greater resources. 
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While group membership and solidarity is necessary for nationalism, Hechter also claims 
it is not sufficient (Hechter 2000). What is needed is the demand for sovereignty. This varying 
demand arises especially with regard to peripheral nationalism where direct rule and resulting 
inequality limits the success of the local elites that are culturally distinct from the distant ruling 
powers, and the members of such groups realize that only by fighting for independence they can 
improve their social status, and thus they mobilize. The members of local elites that become the 
leaders of nationalistic movements tend to be privileged and educated, with high SES, and one 
might argue that high SES and education leads to nationalistic views in this particular scenario. 
Under conditions of lack of access to social and economic opportunities, such individuals' 
membership in nationalist groups and parties thus can have almost instantaneous benefits for the 
emerging educated elites in instances where the power does eventually get transferred to the 
nationalist party fighting for independence.  
In a similar and supporting view, emerging educated minority elites facing inequality and 
blocked opportunities get into the conflict of interest with the current elites of the dominant 
group, specifically in the area of language and religion (Hroch 1993). The political conflict 
grows till it reaches a national level and leads to the creation of a new national identity. The 
educated individuals from the minority groups have a vested interest in the creation of a new 
national identity (nation) because they are prevented from being successful and having power by 
the existing dominant elites. Provided that there is a developed culture of the minority group, and 
an uneven development situation, Hroch (1993) recognizes three factors for the development of a 
nationalist movement: relatively high social mobility of the new elites, sufficiently dense 
communication networks, and a nationally relevant conflict of interest. These conditions also 
correspond to Michael Hechter's (1987, 2000) emphasis on culturally distinct and economically 
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and politically unequal peripheral elites under the direct rule system. Thus being educated as a 
member of a non-dominant group clearly increases nationalistic feelings in individuals. Hroch 
(1993) goes even farther and says that even the beginnings of nations are contingent upon the 
presence of educated people (from non-dominant ethnic groups) collecting information about the 
history, language, and customs of their groups.  
In the second type of approach, one that predicts an inverse relationship of education and 
national identity, the cognitive skills model suggests that that the level of cognitive skills can 
help explain the level of attachment to a group: "The greater an individual's cognitive skills, the 
greater his or her ability to identify with ever larger communities" (Bollen and Medrano 1998, 
drawing on Deutsch 1961 and Inglehart 1970). Thus, in contrast with arguments of Hechter 
(1987, 2000) and Hroch (1993), more educated individuals have weaker attachment to nations; in 
other words, lower levels of national identity than individuals with lower educational levels. 
Persons with higher education are not as strongly attached to groups on national levels and often 
identify with groups at levels above the national one. 
Another way to look at how education influences national identity on the individual level 
is through the prism of values. National identity is considered a traditional, materialist, value 
(Inglehart 1970, 1977, 1990, and 2008). According to Inglehart materialist values in individuals 
are gradually being replaced by post-materialist values under conditions of increased economic 
security and prosperity. Materialist values emphasize survival, and economic and physical 
security; the post-materialist values include self-expression and autonomy. Inglehart (1990) 
draws on two hypotheses to account for the development of post-materialist values: the scarcity 
hypothesis and the socialization hypothesis. The scarcity hypothesis postulates that people most 
value those resources that are in short supply, and the socialization hypothesis emphasizes that 
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one's values depend on what the person experiences during his or her most formative years, in 
other words, during their adolescence and young adulthood. Those values do not change 
significantly during people's lifetimes, and, therefore, values are essentially stable and change 
only very slowly, with the replacement of generations. Consequently, the scarcity hypothesis can 
be related to period effects (short-term), and the socialization hypothesis to the long-term cohort 
effects. The times of scarcity will then lead to the prevalence of materialist values, especially 
among younger generations, and the times of prosperity to more post-materialist values. These 
value orientations affect national identity. Post-materialist values lead to less intense feelings of 
nationalism. Materialist values focus on survival and lead to a sense of group or national 
common interests. Thus strong national identity is consistent with materialistic values and 
inconsistent with post-materialist values. With high SES groups having more privileged 
economic positions and more freedom from focusing on basic survival needs, they are more 
likely to have post-materialist values. 
Additional theory tying education, national identity, and economic conditions is the split 
labor market theory (Bonacich 1972) that focuses on economic interests in its micro-structural 
approach to national identity. According to Bonacich, ethnic antagonisms depend on basic 
economic processes in society, namely the price of labor. Individuals with higher education and 
higher SES are more competitive in the labor market and do not have as much to fear from 
cheaper labor originating in other countries or offered by immigrants as lower-educated workers. 
Thus the workers with lower levels of human capital are more nationalistic because they feel the 
exclusion of ethnically different groups or rigid ethnic stratification and the consequent 
privileging of their own group preserves their position on the market of labor. 
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In summary, existing theoretical approaches acknowledge the key importance of 
education for the feelings of national identification in individuals, but they explain it differently 
and assume different directions of the influence of education on national identity. 
Macro-Structural Approaches 
Similarly to the theoretical framework on the micro-, individual-level, macro-structural 
theorizing on the relationship between education and national identity also covers two opposing 
directions: in one view economic development and other country-level variables increase 
national identity, and in another view the level 2 factors decrease it. Macro-structural elements 
most commonly considered in scholarship on nationalism and national identity are: economic 
development, including industrialization, political conditions, and cultural characteristics. The 
key question is what country-level characteristics most affect societal levels of national identity.  
Many theoretical works on nationalism imply that economic development tends to reduce 
national identity. However, historical studies suggest the opposite: traditional nationalism and 
national identity emerged as a consequence or simultaneously with the advancing 
industrialization in early modern society. 
If one follows Kunovich's (2009) assumption that nationalism is an ideological 
movement that links the nation with the state, and given that one of the basic characteristics of 
each state is its economy and its level of economic development, it is inevitable that nationalism 
and national identity have close connection to economic conditions in the respective states. 
Kunovich (2009) finds that countries with higher economic development have lower national 
identity, and that countries with higher levels of democracy also have lower levels of national 
identity. In another example of this approach Miroslav Hroch (1993) advances the principle that 
it is advisable to study new nationalist movements of the 20
th
 and 21
st
 centuries on the bases of 
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their classical European 19
th
 century predecessors because all national movements have the same 
basic preconditions. Hroch defines nation as: "a large social group integrated not by one but by a 
combination of several kinds of objective relationships (economic, political, linguistic, cultural, 
religious, geographical, and historical), and their subjective reflections in collective 
consciousness," and distinguishes two basic situations (and one transitional one) with respect to 
the development of national identity: In the first scenario are countries with one homogenous 
ethnic group that had one culture and one ruling class. In these countries the modern nation-state 
developed as a community of equal citizens. Examples of this situation might be England, 
France, Poland, Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands. For my research the second scenario is the 
most important one as it includes countries with a dominant and a non-dominant ethnic group 
(mainly Eastern and South-Eastern Europe within the scope of Hroch’s studies). Most of these 
countries had an exogenous ruling class and the dominated ethnic group or groups which did not 
have their own "nobility, political unit, or continuous literary tradition." In some countries the 
non-dominant ethnic groups were assimilated – for example the Catalan. In many other countries 
(most of Central and Eastern Europe) the non-dominant ethnic groups started the process of 
national awareness and nation-building by processes that included increased vertical mobility, 
educational developments, and the increase of the density of their social networks. Hroch's is 
basically a modernization argument even as he stresses that many pro-nationalistic 
characteristics have been observed in agrarian societies. However, his analysis of the differences 
concerning various countries or groups of countries implies that those (groups or countries) that 
did not fully fulfill the conditions for successful nationalist movements might not have become 
independent and thus did not have as high nationalistic feelings or national pride as those that 
successfully did go through all the outlined phases. The final, transitional group of countries had 
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their own ruling class and literary tradition, but did not have their own state at the time 
(19
th
 century) – for example, Germany and Italy. The analysis of this group of countries is not 
directly relevant to my research. 
I follow Hroch’s focus on the second situation that can be theoretically applied to current 
and recent developing countries, the majority of which started their nation-building process and 
created their national identities as colonies dominated by external forces. The successful national 
movements in these countries had to have the following essential elements: a crisis of legitimacy, 
a basic volume of vertical social mobility (some educated people had to come from the non-
dominant ethnic group), a fairly high level of social communication, including literacy, 
schooling, and market relations, and a nationally relevant conflict of interest (Hroch 1993). Thus 
having made education one of the basic elements of a successful national movement Hroch, in 
support of his argument, offers several examples of countries where there was no substantial and 
consistent level of education on a large scale, and a homogenous national identity had not 
resulted – for example in the Baltic states, in the former republics of Yugoslavia, or in Romania. 
Hroch contends that the institution of the civil education in these countries was replaced by 
linguistic and cultural demands. 
The positive role of education in the rise of nations is also stressed in the work of 
Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner, and Anthony D. Smith. Anderson (1983) considers the 
beginnings of nations directly linked to the decreased influence of religion during the 
development of capitalism and the development of print technology. Print capitalism enabled 
mass communications and the increase in literacy on a large scale and that allowed big groups of 
people to grasp the concept of national identity. Educational developments thus influenced the 
political and cultural roots of the modern nation. If one extends Anderson's historical thesis into 
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the current and recent developments, one might predict that the more developed a country is, the 
higher national identity it has. However, Anderson writes of the situation in developing countries 
at the time, so his principles may not apply to countries that are already highly developed. 
Ernest Gellner (1983) places highest significance on the concept of "high culture," by 
which he means the increase of the levels of education in society, literacy, and the development 
of a more sophisticated bureaucratic system that requires improved communication and more 
educated people to function. Gellner emphasizes the importance of print per se, in contrast to 
Anderson's (1983) focus on print capitalism. According to Gellner, only the state is big enough 
and has enough power to provide education-based culture, and the state and the educational 
system need each other to exist. Gellner's approach to national identity is culturally-political in 
the classic modernization spirit. Systematic, mass scale education is needed to produce common 
language among workers and for their retraining. Smith (1992) comments on contemporary 
ethnic revival in Europe and elsewhere, and recognizes three important factors: the increased 
power of the state, widespread literacy, and the development of mass media and public mass 
education systems. The three factors "create divisions along pre-existing ethnic lines." Drawing 
on his own concept of the ancient ethnies, Smith claims these factors bring up resentment in 
minority populations that are newly capable of becoming aware of the neglect and suppression 
they experience by the ruling majority elites. In this aspect Smith comes close to Hroch’s 
argument on the role of the emerging minority elites. Smith (1992) argues that periodic ethnic 
revivals appeared in different parts of the world since the early nineteenth century and 
emphasizes that as long as the world is economically organized into national states, economic 
development will play a role in ethnic nationalism. Smith and Gellner have in some ways similar 
approaches, but Smith definitely puts the roots of national identity firmly into ancient history, 
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while Gellner concentrates on more modern times. Their emphases are comparable in their foci 
on educational systems. Extending these similarities in Smiths' and Gellner's thoughts on 
education, nationalism should be higher in countries that have highly developed mass, public, 
educational systems funded by the state apparatus and oriented toward the strengthening of the 
state. However, that does not seem to be the case in developed countries of today. Another 
similarity between Smith and Gellner is that they both place importance on the unequal treatment 
of the non-dominant groups in the countries that are ethnically diverse. Drawing on O’Leary 
(1997), Gellner (1983) specifically mentions the uneven diffusion of industrialization and 
modernization that create stratification that, one might theorize, can happen in different 
geographical areas or in the same ones but at different times, or successively in one country.  
Thus Gellner's "uneven diffusion" can, in some ways, correspond to Smith's "periodic 
waves of ethnic nationalism" or ethnic revival in the sense that economic development that is 
uneven directly influences minority groups in the affected countries and their subsequent actions 
have impact on the level of national identity in their respective countries. More inequality in a 
country would then mean more nationalist movements and higher national identity. Smith (1992) 
mentions that the waves of ethnic nationalism are applicable to "Western as well as Eastern 
Europe, not to mention the Third World." The processes Anderson, Gellner, and Smith describe 
can be applied not only to emerging nations in the historical perspective, but also to more 
contemporary socio-political theatres with analogous conditions – i.e., developing countries in 
which the nation building process is in its early stages or perhaps not fully complete. 
The "classical" theorists of nationalism – Smith, Gellner, and Anderson – do not really 
address the situation that happens after countries are fully developed, or at least not in their basic 
theoretical approaches, even though, for example, Hroch talks about small nationalistic groups 
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within the European Union. The "classical" or modernist approach might presuppose that the 
higher intensity of characteristics needed to be present to create a nation, the stronger the 
nationalistic feelings and national pride in the nation already created and fully developed. 
However, other processes might be at work. A body of scholarship shedding more light on the 
differences between more or less economically developed countries relates to the study of values 
and provides a slightly different perspective worthy to draw on. For example, Inglehart and 
Baker (2000) claim that values change with economic development but are also path-dependent; 
in other words, that the overall orientation of society (specifically its cultural and religious 
historical heritage) plays a role, as well. This view is somewhat different from the traditional 
modernization theory which suggests that countries follow the same, or a very similar, path while 
being industrialized and while continuing their economic development after that. In this aspect 
Inglehart and Baker share some common ideas with Anthony D. Smith (1992) who privileges 
culture in his treatment of national identity even as he acknowledges the effect of the economy. 
Inglehart and Baker (2000) show that prevailing values are different in rich and poor societies, 
implying that as cultural backgrounds matter, some characteristics of the value changes and their 
rates can, in fact, be predicted. Inglehart's (2008) theory of intergenerational value change among 
individuals thus extends to the level of countries, as well: countries on the lower level of 
industrial development have predominantly materialist values present in their populations, while 
in advanced industrialized countries the post-materialist values prevail. With regard to national 
identity, in one of his original arguments Inglehart (1990) describes the decline of national pride 
as an indicator of national identity in industrialized countries and the emergence of a "sense of 
European citizenship." Inglehart and Baker (2000) distinguish two dimensions of national 
values: traditional v. secular-rational values, and survival v. self-expression values. In largely 
Page | 16 
post-materialist societies secular-rational and self-expression values prevail, while in materialist 
societies traditional and survival values are more common. A strong sense of national pride is, 
according to Inglehart and Baker, one of the traditional values. Consequently, in a certain 
contrast to the more "classical" theorists, Inglehart and Baker conclude that in more developed 
societies national pride and national identity are lower than when those societies were still in 
their developmental stages and the emerging nationalist groups and movements "needed" strong 
sense of national pride and identity to succeed.  
In addition to Inglehart and Baker's (2000) focus on post-materialism, others have offered 
explanations of current differences in national identity across nations. These explanations are 
tested empirically with quantitative cross-national data. Explaining current differences across 
nations as opposed to historical national movements suggests several other macro-level 
determinants of national identity. Jones and Smith (2001) concentrate on the level of (economic) 
development to explain the differences in national identity across nations; the more developed 
nations should have lower levels of national identity. The authors also consider the influence of 
post-industrialization and globalization. Their post-industrialism argument is similar to Inglehart 
and Baker's (2000) emphasis on the difference in values in more industrialized nations and the 
resulting decrease in nationalistic feelings and national pride. Their globalization argument says 
that global forces reduce national identity by supporting independence of people as opposed to 
the obedience to the traditional national authority and by exposing people to other cultures, and 
thus possibly fostering supra-national ties over the local ones. However, although theoretically 
plausible, Jones and Smith's predictions about globalization find only partial support in their 
analyses. 
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Theoretically, ethnic-linguistic fragmentation should reduce national identity through 
encouraging sub-national ties at the expense of the supra-national ones. Kunovich (2009) fails to 
prove a relationship between national identity and internal cultural diversity. This theoretical 
assertion is, however, at least partially supported by Jones and Smith (2001) who suggest that 
internal diversity (including linguistic diversity and regional versus national ties) decreases 
national identity. On the other hand Kunovich (2006) finds that, for example, in European 
countries with larger Muslim populations the identification with Christianity increases national 
identity. These findings support the importance of internal diversity for the national identity, but 
do not address definitively in which direction, and under which conditions this is happening.  
Increased level of democracy should decrease national pride and national identity. 
Democratic institutions provide feelings of stability and security and are more likely to fulfill 
people's needs so that the polity need not search for alternative institutions to fulfill said needs 
like, for example, nationalist movements. Support for this argument is found, for example, in 
Kunovich (2009) who argues that countries with stronger democracies have lower levels of 
national identity; his findings show that political pluralism in countries with strong democracies, 
indeed, decreases national identity. 
Combined Micro-Macro Approach 
An overview of theories and research suggests that, at the micro-structural level, 
education can have both a positive or negative influence on national identity, depending on the 
national context. A country's level of development, democracy, and internal cultural diversity 
may affect not only the level of national identity, but they may also may reduce or increase the 
influence of education on national identity. A combined approach specifies the direction of this 
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influence by integrating the micro-structural and macro-structural components and by developing 
hypotheses that have yet to be systematically tested.  
To summarize, at the micro-structural level some theorists treat education as 
strengthening national identity (Hechter 1987, Hroch 1993). People with more education and in 
countries with lower economic development, diversity, and cultural homogeneity recognize that 
national independence or more power for their ethnic group increases their opportunity to use 
their education to their advantage. Other social scientists treat education as weakening national 
identity (Inglehart 2008, Bollen and Medrano 1998, Bonacich 1972). Individuals with higher 
education do not feel the need to join together in nationalist groups because their position in 
society gives them various advantages, is relatively secure and stable, and is not threatened by 
people with lower education or immigrants. This situation is typically found in countries that are 
highly developed economically and politically and have higher cultural homogeneity. 
The theories on the macro-structural level take two broad forms. One set of theories 
argues that economic development and related societal transformations increase national identity 
by enabling formerly disadvantaged groups of people to get educated, mobilize, and to 
disseminate nationalist ideas through improved technology. The increased density of the 
upwardly mobile population and the development of the modern state also contribute to the 
emergence of nationalist identities (Anderson 1983, Gellner 1983, Smith 1991 and 1992, and 
Hroch 1993.) Another set of theories posits that economic development and related societal 
characteristics decrease national identity because large groups of people have achieved material 
security and their interests shift from the focus on physical survival to post-materialist values 
such as personal fulfillment and tolerance (Inglehart 1970, 1977, 1990, 2008, Inglehart and 
Baker 2000, Jones and Smith 2001, and Kunovich 2009.) Most authors consider economic 
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development a crucial factor influencing national identity; however, some consider other factors 
such as the level of democracy (Kunovich 2009), culture (Inglehart and Baker 2000), or 
globalization (Jones and Smith 2001.) Thus, depending on the stage of development and 
historical period, economic development and related characteristics can either facilitate or inhibit 
national identity. 
These differences in theoretical approaches at the micro and macro level suggest a 
multilevel approach that captures the diversity of influences of education across national 
contexts. Education increases national identity in societal contexts where opportunities of the 
most educated are blocked by low economic development, lack of democracy, or ethnic-
linguistic-religious divisions. From a rational choice viewpoint, the adoption of nationalist 
attitudes by more educated groups represents a means to greater resources. This argument 
extends macro theories about the facilitative influence of economic development and related 
characteristics to fit arguments about the positive influence of education on national identity. 
However, where the societal context offers greater opportunities for the most educated, 
where economic development is high, political procedures are democratic, and ethnic-linguistic-
religious divisions are moderate, education will lead to lower national identity. From a post-
materialist viewpoint, the adoption of less nationalist attitudes by highly educated groups 
represents a response to economic security and concerns with self-expression, pluralism, and 
tolerance. This argument extends macro theories about the inhibitive influence of economic 
development and related characteristics to fit arguments about the negative influence of 
education on national identity. 
The micro-relationship between individual education and national identity thus varies 
across macro-contexts of economic development, democratic politics, and cultural diversity. 
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Applied to diverse nations across the world today, these claims can be laid out in the form of 
hypotheses at the micro, macro, and micro-macro levels: 
1. Micro: Education, on average, tends to have modest influence on national identity 
across diverse nations. 
2. Macro: Economic development, democratic political institutions, and cultural 
homogeneity tend to reduce national identity. 
3. Micro-Macro: Economic development, democratic political institutions, and cultural 
homogeneity tend to shift the influence of education on national identity from toward 
the negative. 
While the hypotheses are presented in a general form, variations may apply to different 
components of national identity. Smith (1991) emphasizes the importance of national pride as a 
component of national identity, Kunovich (2009) distinguishes between ethnic and civic forms of 
national identity, and Quillian (1995) and Kunovich (2009) treat attitudes toward immigrants as 
closely related to national identity. The chapters that follow adapt the hypotheses to fit the 
specific outcome under study, but these three summarize the general framework. 
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CHAPTER II – METHOD 
Data 
In order to test the hypotheses outlined in the theoretical section I utilize the World 
Values Survey (WVS). WVS is a large, world-wide dataset consisting of national surveys that 
cover almost 90 percent of the world's population (Inglehart 2010). The World Values Survey 
was founded in 1981 in Stockholm, originally as the European Values Study with the goal of 
examining how economic and technological changes impact values in industrialized countries. 
Over time it was decided not to limit the surveys to developed countries, and additional nations 
were added. The World Values Survey operates on the premise that social values are a global 
phenomenon and need to be considered in a global context. The primary goal of the World 
Values Survey, according to its Mission Statement (World Values Survey 2012), is to monitor 
and analyze changes in social values across the world and to share the results of this large-scale 
social research with scientists and policy makers. An important part of the surveys is to 
investigate how social change influences economic and political life. Another, more pragmatic, 
goal is to establish a world-wide network of social scientists for the collaboration on the social 
change research and the dissemination of the results of such research free of charge. A 
secondary, yet very pronounced, goal of the World Values Survey is to broaden and spread 
cutting edge social survey methodology to support its stated mission. 
The surveys are carried out by using a standardized questionnaire on a representative 
national sample in each society (society corresponds to an individual country, except for two or 
three countries, depending on the wave. For example, the territories of the former East and West 
Germany are sampled separately and results reported as both two separate societies and as one 
country). The samples aim to be representative on the basic variables, for example age, sex, 
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occupation, and regional distribution within a given society. The World Values Survey allows 
quota sampling when full probability samples would be too expensive to obtain (World Values 
Survey 2011a). The rules for Principal Investigators pertaining to sampling are in Appendix A. 
The sampling details, principal investigators, and other technical information including 
the national questionnaires in the original languages are available on the WVS website: 
www.wvs.org. The technical specifications also describe in detail the training of the interviewers 
in each country, and issues, if any, that arise with each variable in the questionnaire. For 
example, in Ghana, where there are not many governmental structures in society, respondents 
had problems distinguishing between "official" and community organizations (World Values 
Survey 2011b).
1
 The main advantage of the WVS dataset is that it contains data from many 
varied countries on different levels of economic development, with different cultures, political 
systems, diversity/ cultural homogeneity, and values. I use the fifth, newest, wave of the WVS 
that was conducted in 2005-2008 in 57 countries and had 82 992 total respondents. The World 
Values Survey is used to examine the individual-level data within the countries. The countries in 
the World Values Survey dataset are not randomly selected. Most of the countries that have been 
participating in the survey have been self-selected and have financed their own research under 
the guidance of the World Values Survey’s Executive Committee in return for getting data on the 
rest of the countries in the Survey (World Values Survey 2012). Occasionally, the Executive 
Committee determines that additional information would be beneficial to the overall goals of the 
Survey and countries with certain characteristics (e.g., specific religious makeup) need to be 
included in the World Values Survey. Depending on funds available, the World Values Survey 
Association subsidizes some or all of the cost for these countries’ research. The list of the 
                                                 
1
 This particular issue is not relevant to my research, but shows how diligently the research design is done and how 
well documented, and increases confidence in the secondary data.  
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countries included in the fifth wave is in Appendix B. There are seven countries in the Sub-
Saharan African region, ten countries in the Asian region, nine countries in the Eastern European 
region, six countries in the Middle East and North African region, nine countries in the South 
American region, and sixteen countries in Western Europe and the West, for a total of six 
regions. 
Dependent Variables 
National Pride 
Following Gaber (2006), national pride is used as the main measure of national identity. 
Gaber defines national identity as:  
…the recognition of one's own membership in the nation and one's emotional 
attachment to this group. National pride can be interpreted as a strong positive 
attitude toward one's own nation. It covers cognitive and affective aspects of this 
attitude measuring the extent to which the respondent recognizes himself/herself 
as a member of the nation and feels emotionally attached to it. 
The WVS questionnaire asks: "How proud are you to be [substitute your own nationality; 
for example, French]?" with four possible answers: “very proud,” “quite proud,” “not very 
proud,” and “not at all proud.” If the respondent volunteers that he or she is not of the particular 
nationality, the fifth answer is: "I am not [substitute your own nationality]." After consulting 
with several principal investigators in different countries it is clear that the fifth answer, if 
present, is recorded as missing data. National pride's values range from 1-4 with 4 being the 
highest (most national pride). National pride is the main dependent variable in the analysis and 
has 79,339 cases in 56 countries. Only one country is missing all data on this variable (Peru). 
Even though used in prior research (Gaber 2006), the national pride variable has limitations. 
There are four possible answers and there is no neutral answer available. While having a neutral 
option would be useful, it is possible that the methodologists of the World Values Survey were 
trying to eliminate fence-sitter answers among the respondents. Shuman and Presser (1981) 
Page | 24 
report that fence-sitters can comprise up to 10 to 20 percent of respondents in surveys. The 
World Values Survey does not provide information about pretests and posttests of its items, but it 
is plausible they were done and this option was not included for an undisclosed research design 
reasons. The way the question is currently worded does force an answer, but it is a feelings-based 
(as opposed to a knowledge-based) question with an implicit positive charge. Possibly including 
an “I have no opinion” option would require negatively charged answers on the opposite end, 
and there is no clear and precise antonym to national pride if one does not want to include “hate” 
– an admittedly much stronger word emotionally. In absence of the neutral answer I believe most 
respondents that are not particularly proud can choose the “not very proud” option which does 
not point to great pride but also does not connote excessively negative feelings. 
National Pride Scale 
Second measure used to examine national pride is the national pride composite scale. 
Following Norris and Inglehart (2009) the standardized scale is created by averaging of the 
national pride variable, the feelings of being a citizen of a nation, and the feelings of belonging 
to a local community. Norris and Inglehart use the identical three items from the World Values 
Survey (fifth wave) as a basis for several of their measures of national identification and 
cosmopolitanism and illustrate their validity by principal-component factor analysis. The "local" 
component is the answer to the statement: "I see myself as member of my local community" with 
1 being "strongly disagree" and 4 being "strongly agree." The item values in my research are 
reversed from the original dataset so they increase in the same direction as the national pride 
values. The same is true for the "national" variable, which is an answer to the statement: "I see 
myself as citizen of the [country] nation," 1 means "strongly disagree" and 4 means "strongly 
agree." National pride scale's values range from -4.11 to 1.01. The scale is skewed to the left 
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because of the components used to create it. Many respondents have a strong tendency to be 
proud, but relatively few who disagree skew the scale. The Cronbach's alpha (standardized 
items) for the scale is 0.6034. The national pride component is the same as described above. The 
composite scale has 80,780 cases in 56 countries.  
There is an additional item in the World Values Survey that, theoretically, could have 
been used in the scale, and that is the answer to the statement: "I see myself as a world citizen." 
However, there are several problematic issues regarding this item. First, the inclusion of the 
“world citizen” variable lowered the scale's reliability. Second, it is possible that in many 
countries the term "world citizen" does not have enough meaning to get accurate responses. After 
reading on the World Values Survey’s website how investigators in less developed countries are 
facing difficulties even with defining government services versus community-based services and 
organizations (World Values Survey 2011b), I realized that being a world citizen might not make 
any sense to people outside of Western industrialized nations. I searched for the origins of the 
term, and found out that it was officially used for the first time in 1993 by the United Nations 
Commission for Sustainable Development (Bahá'í International Community 1993), aside from 
the classic quote ascribed to Socrates. I believe the analytical results would be skewed by its 
possible erroneous understanding. Third, while attempting different types of scales’ creation with 
the world citizen item, STATA kept confusing the reversed and unreversed items, and produced 
warnings about errors in the analysis. Fourth, the world citizen item is also conspicuously absent 
from Norris and Inglehart’s (2009) measures, even though the authors research cosmopolitanism 
and certainly one can assume that Ronald Inglehart as one of the directors of the World Values 
Survey is aware of the variables included in it. These occurrences have lead me to believe there 
might be a technical and/or sampling problem with the world citizen variable and I decided not 
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to use it. The national pride and the national pride scale as indicators of national identity are 
examined in Chapter III. 
Ethnic and Civic National Identity 
The ethnic and civic dimensions of national identity are analyzed in Chapter IV. While 
many scholars study national identity as a homogenous concept (see, for example, McCrone and 
Bechthofer 2010), others (Hobsbawm [1990] 1992) follow the theoretical framework of Meincke 
([1907] 1970) and Kohn (1944) that distinguishes between ethnic and civic dimensions of 
national identity. Social science research consistently confirms that the concepts of the ethnic 
and civic components of national identity are important for understanding of people's opinions, 
attitudes, and behaviors in various situations (Jones and Smith 2001, Kunovich 2009, Pehrson, 
Vignoles and Brown 2009, Meeus et al. 2010, and Pehrson and Green 2010). Using International 
Social Survey Programme’s (ISSP) 2003 National Identity II Module Kunovich (drawing on 
Medrano 2005) creates ethnic and civic constructs of national identity. Kunovich (2009) uses the 
ISSP dataset to divide the following eight national identity survey items into the ethnic and civic 
categories: 
Some people say that the following things are important for being truly [e.g., 
American]. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each 
of the following is? 
[Not important at all, not very important, fairly important, or very important] 
1. To have been born in [America] 
2. To have [American] citizenship 
3. To have lived in [America] for most of one's life 
4. To be able to speak [English] 
5. To be a [Christian] 
6. To respect [America's political institutions and laws 
7. To feel [American] 
8. To have [American] ancestry 
Kunovich includes being born in a country, having lived in a country, having ancestry, 
being a citizen, and having the same religion as ethnic factors, and to feel as a national, to speak 
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the same language, and to have respect for political institutions and laws as the civic factors. The 
World Values Survey does not include as many items on national identity (its main advantage 
being the number of countries surveyed), but it does contain questions on what should be used to 
grant citizenship. While citizenship itself can belong to both civic and ethnic categories of 
national identity depending on restrictions each country places on it (Kunovich 2009), the items 
asking about citizenship can clearly be used to distinguish the ethnic and the civic dimensions of 
national identity that are important to people. Kunovich (2009), employing factor analysis, 
considers the most unambiguous indicators of ethnic and civic national identity the items 
"ancestry" for the ethnic and "respect" for the civic form. Even though the World Values Survey 
contains fewer items on the ethnic / civic indicators, the most important ones are included. I 
create two scales, one for the ethnic, and one for the civic dimension of national identity. Each 
scale has two items based on the answer to the question (number of countries missing data on 
each variable are in parentheses):  
In your opinion, how important should the following be as requirements for 
somebody seeking citizenship of your country? Specify for each requirement if 
you consider it as very important, rather important, or not important: 
a. Having ancestors from my country (12) 
b. Being born on my country’s soil (13) 
c. Adopting the customs of my country (12) 
d. Abiding by my country’s laws (12) 
Items a) and b) are pertinent to the ethnic dimension of national identity; items c) and d) 
to its civic dimension. Additionally, I use a combined dependent variable called national identity 
that includes all four items. Cronbach's alphas (unstandardized items) are as follows: Ethnic: 
0.8241, civic: 0.5967, combined (national identity): 0.6837. 
Since the ISSP and the WVS items are similar, I am able to compare my results with 
Kunovich (2009). I analyze the ethnic and civic dimensions of national identity, and national 
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identity as one variable, and their relation to education and economic development in a way 
similar to my analysis of the national pride variables. The advantage of my research over 
Kunovich's (2009) is that the World Values Survey includes data for many more countries than 
Kunovich uses, and they are countries on all levels of economic development.
2
  
Policy Preferences 
To fully test my theory I needed to extend the analyses of the effect of education on 
national identity to the “real world.” Levels of national identity are directly linked to political 
behavior, for example preferences for immigration policies (Quillian 1995, Kunovich 2009). 
Education influences national identity and has an effect on people’s policy preferences, as well.  
The item in the World Values Survey asking about attitudes toward immigrants can be 
used to examine the preferences for restrictive immigration policies: 
How about people from other countries coming here to work. Which one of the 
following do you think the government should do? 
a. Let anyone come who wants to? 
b. Let people come as long as jobs are available? 
c. Place strict limits on the number of foreigners who can come here? 
d. Prohibit people coming here from other countries? 
Policy preferences are examined in Chapter V. 
Independent Variables 
Individual-Level (Level 1) Independent Variables 
Key sociodemographic variables used in my research are: education, gender, age, marital 
status, number of children, employment status, income, financial satisfaction, savings in the past 
year, social class, religiosity, and the immigration status of the respondent's parents. Number of 
countries missing data on each variable is in parentheses. 
                                                 
2
 Although Shulman (2002) suggests a third, cultural, dimension of national identity, Kunovich's analyses of the 
resulting three-factor model encounter severe estimation problems, and the author determines that a two-factor 
model best fits the data. 
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Education (none missing): is coded as the highest attained (or, for students, expected to 
be attained) educational level out of nine categories: no formal education, incomplete primary 
school, complete primary school, incomplete secondary school (technical/ vocational type), 
complete secondary school (technical/ vocational type), incomplete secondary school 
(university-preparatory type), complete secondary school (university-preparatory type), some 
university-level education without degree, and university-level education with degree. Values 
range from 1 to 9. 
 Gender (none missing): female (0) or male (1). 
 Age (none missing): in years, 15-98. 
 Marital status (none missing): not married (0) or married (1). 
 Number of children (none missing): 0-8 (8 indicates eight or more children). 
 Employment status (2 missing) is recoded as not employed or other (0), and 
employed or student (1). 
 Income (2 missing) in deciles: 1 indicates the "lowest income decile" and 10 the 
"highest income decile" within each country, including all wages, salaries, pensions 
and other incomes that come in. 
 Satisfaction with the financial situation of household (none missing): range of 1-10 
(least to most satisfied). 
 Family savings during past year (5 missing): spent savings and borrowed money (1), 
spent some savings and borrowed money (2), just got by (3), and saved money (4). 
 Self-reported social class (7 missing) is recoded as: lower class (1), working class (2), 
lower middle class (3), and upper or upper middle class (4). 
 Religiosity (none missing) is recoded as not religious (0) or religious (1). 
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 Immigrant status of the respondent's mother and father (separately; 13 missing): not 
an immigrant (0), an immigrant (1). 
Country-Level (Contextual, Aggregate, Level 2) Independent Variables 
I use the terms country-level, level 2, contextual, and aggregate variables interchangeably 
in my dissertation. The main conceptual differences between the various terms are attributable to 
the way these variables are constructed, yet are often used interchangeably (Roux 2002), along 
with the terms derived or integral variables. For my study it is most important to note the level of 
analysis – the level of countries (macro-structural) and the consideration of individuals as nested 
within countries. Listing all terms at all times or specifying how each of the eight level 2 
variables was constructed in every instance would be confusing. The country-level measures 
come from several different sources and can be divided into four groups: 
A. Economic Development and Social Modernization: 
GDP (Gross Domestic Product) in dollars per capita (based on purchasing power parity) 
as reported by the World Bank in the Penn World Tables (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2006). 
The missing GDP values are estimated for the correct years by using countries' values from 
earlier years and HDI values. 
The UN Human Development Index (United Nations 2011). The Human Development 
Index is a composite index that reflects both social and economic development. Its components 
consist of life expectancy at birth, education or "knowledge" expressed by adult literacy and 
school enrollment, and the GDP per capita adjusted for purchasing-power parity that indicates 
income or a standard of living (U.N. 2011). The HDI formula has changed in 2009, and now 
includes a slightly different measures (for example GNI [Gross National Income] instead of the 
GDP), but I use the values from the original formula used in 2005, corresponding to the fifth 
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wave of the WVS. The HDI gives less weight than GDP to oil-rich countries with high 
inequality. For 2005 it ranges from 361-968. 
B. Political Characteristics: 
Democracy. The democracy measure is created by averaging of two scales by Freedom 
House (Freedom House 2011): political rights and civil liberties. Freedom House (2011) states 
that political rights: "… enable people to participate freely in the political process, including to 
right to vote freely for distinct alternative in legitimate elections, compete for public office, join 
political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on 
public policies and are accountable to the electorate." Civil liberties "… allow for the freedoms 
of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal 
autonomy without interference from the state." The measures are recoded so that the highest 
values mean the highest levels of democracy. This is the opposite of the Freedom House's 
original coding. The democracy values in my research range from 1.5 (lowest) to 7 (highest).  
C. Measures of Cultural Homogeneity: 
While cultural characteristics of countries can be many, in existing literature and with 
regard to economic development, the most important ones usually addressed are linguistic and 
ethnic fragmentation or fractionalization, and religious fragmentation (Kunovich 2009, Alesina 
et al. 2003, Easterly and Levine 1997, Fearon 2003). The theoretical maximum of 
fractionalization measures happens when each person belongs to a different group (Alesina, 
et al. 2003). In my research I use reversed measures – measures of homogeneity to show the 
probability of people belonging to the same groups, because national identity as a traditional 
value is assumed to be higher among people in the same groups (valuing national sentiments). 
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The ethnic, linguistic, and religious homogeneity measures are created by taking their 
respective fractionalization measures and deducting them from 1, which results in the 
homogeneity measures. Alesina et al. (2003) create new, separate indices describing ethnic, 
linguistic, and religious fragmentation. The authors use sources from Encyclopedia Britannica, 
CIA, and Minority Rights International. I adopt these new measures because having three 
separate variables avoids possible obscuring of the studied relationships by multicollinearity 
sometimes present in indices with closely-related items. The values of ethnic homogeneity in my 
sample range from .2192 (Zambia) to .9980 (South Korea). The values of linguistic homogeneity 
range from .1266 (Zambia) to .9979 (South Korea). The values of religious homogeneity range 
from .1397 (South Africa) to .9965 (Morocco). 
D. Values-Related Indices: 
National identity is related to culture as shown in the theoretical part of my dissertation. 
The countries of the world are culturally different in many ways. Since I set to examine the 
influence of education on national identity in various cultural contexts I decided, in addition to 
considering ethnic, linguistic, and religious homogeneity, to take into account Inglehart’s (1997) 
and Inglehart and Baker’s (2000) ideas on how cross-cultural differences are path dependent and 
not contingent on economic factors alone. Inglehart perceives culture as positioned along two 
dimensions, the traditional/secular-rational dimension that focuses on the importance of religion 
in society and associated values, and the survival/self-expression dimension that signifies the 
continuum between materialist and post-materialist values. The two dimensions are expressed in 
the World Values Survey as two scales (originally described in Inglehart 1997 and Inglehart and 
Baker 2000). Variables representing these scales are calculated from the World Values Survey 
and provided as part of the World Values Survey dataset. In the present research I call them 
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secularity and self-expression and they are coded so that their higher values mean the countries 
are more secular, or exhibit more self-expression values on average. Secularity ranges from -1.94 
to 1.96, and self-expression from -1.66 to 2.35. 
Missing Data 
There are several types of missing data in my research: 
1. Not all items are asked in all countries. 
2. Individuals do not always answer every question (for various reasons not necessarily 
predictable ones). 
3. Some of the aggregate variables do not include all countries from the World Values 
Survey's fifth wave. 
The above indicates that at least some of the data are not missing at random; in other 
words, they vary systematically. To ensure the missing variables are not unduly influencing the 
results of the analyses I start with a very simple model that includes one contextual variable 
(GDP) and basic independent, individual-level variables (sex, marital status, employment status, 
age, age squared, education, and satisfaction with financial situation). This model has 71, 475 
cases in 53 countries. The next model has 62, 362 cases in 51 countries; the numbers of 
respondents and countries get reduced by the addition of the number of children, religiosity, and 
income to the equation. In the third model I add savings in the past year, social class, and the 
immigrant status of the respondent's mother and father. Because the immigration status questions 
are not asked in certain countries, this final model contains 44, 526 cases in 40 countries.  
After running the analyses for different contextual variables for each model described 
above I double check the results by running the equations casewise. The regression equation with 
fewest variables (and, therefore, originally with the most cases and countries) is applied to the 
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models with medium and fewest cases, as well (using the same subsets of cases as the latter 
models have). This ascertains that the results are robust and not caused by the reduction in the 
number of cases due to the missing values. *I might have to add this on Tuesday. 
For the analyses focusing on national identity (Chapters III and IV; five dependent 
variables total) there are no substantial differences in the means of basic demographic variables 
for the largest samples with the most cases and countries (Model 1) as compared to the smallest 
samples with the least cases and countries (Model 3). The samples with the least numbers of 
cases and countries appear to have slightly older respondents (the biggest observed difference 
being 0.6 years), and less than one percent more of the respondents are married (between 63 and 
64 percent). There is a very slight increase in education: at the most 0.03 – 0.06 of a category 
(there are 9 categories for education total). The rest of the differences are trivial, if any. For the 
basic demographic variables in Chapter V, where the dependent variable is “preferences for 
restrictive immigration policies,” there is no difference in the means of education for the 
samples, and the differences for age and marital status are about the same as in the samples used 
in Chapters III and IV: 0.7 for age and one percent for being married. Thus the smaller samples 
reveal a bias that is most likely due to the fact that the battery of questions on immigration was 
not asked in certain countries. Judging from the differences, the country samples were biased 
toward more developed countries, with older and higher educated population, but only very 
slightly. However, even with the bias present, my results are consistent for samples of different 
sizes for all dependent variables. 
Models 
Multilevel models are well suited for the consideration of connections between national 
identity, education, and contextual factors in the countries of the world. The models allow 
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coefficients relating individual (micro) determinants of national identity to vary randomly across 
nations and for contextual (macro) determinants to influence that variation (Raudenbush and 
Bryk 2002). The WVS and the aggregate level measures provide enough data for an adequate 
number of level 2 countries (57). Most authors recommend 20 and 50 cases for a random 
intercept model, and a random slopes model, respectively (Bickel 2007, Hox 2002, Kreft and de 
Leeuw 1998). 
Restricted maximum likelihood estimates of multilevel model coefficients in xtmixed in 
STATA 11 adjust for clustering by nation, different sample sizes for level 1 and level 2 units, 
and heteroscedastic error terms – issues that would otherwise cause estimated standard error 
terms to have a downward bias (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). The disadvantage of the xtmixed 
command in STATA 11 is that it does not allow for probability weighting within countries. I ran 
linear regression models with and without weighting and the results differ very little.  
Given the focus of the study, I limit the number of predictors to one random slope 
(education) in the multilevel models. This process reduces the number of error covariances and 
increases the level 2 degrees of freedom. At level 1, the national pride for an individual i in a 
nation j (NPij) is a function of two sets of individual predictors, education (Eij) and p control 
variables (Xpij), and an error term (rij): 
(1a) NPij = β0j + β1j*Eij + Σ βpj*Xpij + rij 
All determinants are centered at their means. β0j shows the mean national pride, and βij 
and βpj show the effects of two groups of predictors for each nation – education is treated as 
random and one set p is treated as fixed. At level 2, a set of equations treat the level 1 β 
coefficients as outcomes. With m contextual measures (Cmj) as determinants of the β coefficients 
for education, the level 2 equations have the following form (Luke 2004):  
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(1b) β0j = γ00 + Σ γ0m*Cmj + u0j 
(1c) β1j = γ10 + Σ γ1m*Cmj + u1j 
(1d) βpj = γp 
The model treats the intercept (β0j) and education effects (β1j) as random and the p effects 
(βpj) as fixed. The γ0m coefficients then represent the effects of the aggregate variables on the 
nation-specific level of national pride and the γ1m coefficients represent the effects of the 
aggregate variables on the country-specific effects of education. I analyze the effect of one 
aggregate variable at a time, since preliminary analyses show that the level 2 variables strongly 
influence each other. The error terms in equations 1b and 1c are assumed to be multivariate 
normally distributed; each with a mean of zero, and non-zero variances and covariances. 
Recap of Hypotheses 
On the micro-structural level theorists agree that education influences national identity. 
Some treat it as strengthening national identity; others consider it a weakening force. Overall, 
from theoretical and empirical studies it seems that education, on average, tends to reduce 
national identity. Thus the micro-structural hypotheses state: 
H1null: There is no association between education of individuals and their 
levels of national pride. 
H1 alternate: Education has a statistically significant, negative, effect on 
national pride across diverse countries. 
On the macro-structural level some theories point to economic development as increasing 
national identity by helping emerging minority elites to get education, mobilize, and spread ideas 
through new technology. Another set of theories claims that economic development (and other 
macro-level characteristics) decreases national identity as people's values shift from more 
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traditional, materialistic values to the post-materialistic ones. Economic development, 
democratic political institutions, and cultural homogeneity, on average, tend to reduce national 
identity. The macro-structural hypotheses state: 
H2 null: There is no association between the levels of aggregate (contextual) 
variables and the national pride of individuals living in those respective 
countries. 
H2 alternate: The average level of aggregate variables in a country influences 
the level of national pride of individuals living in that country in a statistically 
significant way. Theoretical framework points to this influence being negative. 
On the combined micro/macro level the multilevel approach suggests that education 
influences national identity differently on differing levels of economic development – education 
increases national identity where opportunities for educated people are blocked by low economic 
development, lack of democracy, or cultural divisions, and decreases it in countries where the 
opportunities for educated people are greater. Thus, the third set of hypotheses states: 
H3 null: There is no association between the levels of aggregate variables and 
the effect of education on national pride. 
H3 alternate: Aggregate-level variables influence the relationship between 
education and national pride in a statistically significant way. Theoretical 
framework points to this influence being negative. 
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CHAPTER III – ANALYSIS: NATIONAL IDENTITY 
In this chapter, I use multilevel analysis to test the hypotheses outlined in the theoretical 
section of this dissertation. In Chapter II hypothesize that on the micro-level education has an 
influence on national identity across diverse nations, that on the macro-level higher economic 
development reduces national identity, and that on the combined micro/macro level economic 
development pushes the influence of education toward the negative.  
In multilevel models individuals are treated as nested within societies, and variations 
within and across nations thus become apparent. National pride is used as an indicator of national 
identity, following prior studies (e.g., Gaber 2006). I first test the influence of individual-level 
characteristics (with focus on education) on national pride. Second, I test the effects of 
contextual level variables on national pride, and the effects contextual level variables have on the 
relationship between education as an individual characteristic and national pride.  
I use two dependent variables to examine national identity: national pride and national 
pride scale, a standardized scale created by averaging the national pride variable, the feelings of 
being a citizen of a nation, and the feelings of belonging to a local community. To assess the 
influence of education on national identity, education is allowed to vary randomly across 
countries in the multilevel models, both its intercepts and the slopes. The models assume that 
there is a cross-level interaction between education and country-level variables. Level 2 variables 
are allowed to shape the outcome of level 1 (Luke 2004). For my research this means that the 
models show how country-level (level 2) variables influence the relationship between education 
and national pride (national pride being level 1 variable). This is due to the nested structure of 
the relationships studied – individuals are considered as nested within countries and there is an 
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assumption that country characteristics can influence individual behavior (in this case national 
pride) as much as other individual factors (Luke 2004). 
Results 
Table 1 describes means and sample sizes of the individual- and country-level variables 
(also referred to as level 2, or contextual, variables) used in the analysis in this chapter. 
Variable (Type) 
N 
(Indiv.) 
N 
(Ctry.) Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variables 
National Pride 79,339 56 3.49 .71 1 4 
National Pride 
(composite scale) 80,780 56 -.03 .83 -4.11 1.01 
Member of Local 
Community 
(used for scale creation) 67,228 47 3.32  .67 1 4 
Member of National 
Community (used for 
scale creation) 67,791 47 3.50 .61 1 4 
Independent Variables (Individual Level) 
Marital Status 82,731 57 .63 .48 0 1 
Number of Children 77,692 57 1.92 1.84 0 8 
Financial Satisfaction 78,921 57 5.22 2.47 1 10 
Religiosity 80,039 57 .70 .46 0 1 
Father immigrant 60,501 44 .06 .25 0 1 
Mother immigrant 60,568 44 .07 .25 0 1 
sex 82,896 57 .48 .50 0 1 
Age 82,725 57 41.41  16.48 15 98 
Age Squared 82,725 57 1,986.89 1,533.84 225 9,604 
Education 82,408 57 5.25  2.50 1 9 
Employed 79,652 55 .60 .49 0 1 
Savings in the Past Year 72,632 52 2.87 .93  1 4 
Income 74,680 55 4.58 2.31 1 10 
Social Class 68,901 50 2.61 .97 1 4 
Independent Variables (Country Level) 
GDP 82,992 57 16,458.07 13,021.46 1,110 48,393 
Human Development 
Index (HDI) 79,064 55 807.8 154.36 361 968 
Democracy 
(composite scale) 81,740 56 5.51 1.68 1.5 7 
Political Rights  
(used for scale creation) 81,740 56 2.54 1.89 1 7 
Civil Liberties 
(used for scale creation) 81,740 56 2.45 1.52 1 6 
Secularity (scale) 81,492 56 -.25 1.01 -1.94 1.96 
Self-Expression (scale) 81,492 56 .10 1.06 -1.68 2.35 
Ethnic Homogeneity 82,992 57 .61 .24 .22 1 
Language Homogeneity 80,265 55 .65 .27 .13 1 
Religious Homogeneity 81,772 56 .54 .24 .14 1 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Individual-Level and Country-Level 
Variables Used in Chapter III Analysis 
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The main dependent variable in the analysis is national pride. National pride's values 
range from 1 to 4 with 4 being the highest (most national pride). National pride as the main 
dependent variable in the analysis has 79,339 cases in 56 countries. 
The second dependent variable is the national pride scale comprised of the following 
components: national pride scale's values range from -4.11 to 1.01. The components of the scale 
are: 
1. National Pride (as mentioned above). 
2. Feelings of being a member of a local community. The "local" component is the answer 
to the statement: "I see myself as member of my local community" with 1 being "strongly 
disagree" and 4 being "strongly agree." 
3. Feelings of being a citizen of a national community. The "national" variable is an answer 
to the statement: "I see myself as citizen of the [country] nation," 1 means "strongly 
disagree" and 4 means "strongly agree." 
The item values are reversed from the original dataset so they increase in the same 
direction as the national pride values. The composite scale has 80,780 cases in 56 countries. 
However, owing to the relatively small number of cases with the highest values on the national 
pride variables, the scale skews it to the left. 
From independent variables, the variable describing sex has the most cases (82,896), and 
the GDP has the most cases on the contextual level (82,992), both in 57 countries. On level 1, the 
least number of cases is observed for the immigrant status of the father of the respondent (60,501 
in 44 countries), and on level 2 for the Human Development Index (79,064 in 55 countries). 
To preview, the multilevel analyses support the hypotheses outlined in Chapter I. At the 
micro-structural level education tends to have, on average, a negative influence on national 
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identity. The theories that posit that education has a positive effect on national identity are not 
supported overall, but the average may hide diversity across countries. More detailed discussion 
of this finding is provided in the Discussion and Conclusions section of this chapter.  
National Pride 
Table 2 presents the results of the multilevel regression of national pride on individual-
level characteristics controlling for the GDP. Included in the table are unstandardized 
coefficients that show the change in national pride for a one unit change in a predictor. The 
z-ratios are used to determine statistical significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels. The 
analyses are run for three different sets of variables and cases. The first model has the most 
countries and most cases, but fewer individual independent variables. As individual-level 
variables are added, the numbers of countries and cases decline because of missing values. 
National Pride 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 b z b z b z 
Sex (Male) .0038 .76 .0184 ** 3.48 .0235 *** 3.83 
Married .0359 *** 6.36 .0231 *** 3.71 .0226 ** 3.13 
Employed -.0136 * -2.33 -.0133 * -2.14 -.0095 -1.31 
Age -.0020 * -2.32 -.0030 ** -3.20 -.0032 ** -2.91 
Age2 .0000 *** 5.02 .0000 *** 4.85 .0000 *** 4.02 
Education -.0141 *** -3.92 -.0114 ** -3.22 -.0143 *** -4.10 
Financial Satisfaction -.0211 *** -19.92 -.0199 *** -16.53 -.0182 *** -12.48 
Children    .0078 *** 4.09 .0089 *** 3.94 
Religiosity    .1316 *** 20.85 .1330 *** 17.48 
Income     -.0008 -0.58 .0016 0.91 
Savings      .0053 1.50 
Social Class      .0057 1.46 
Father Immigrant       -.0162  -0.83 
Mother Immigrant       -.0540 ** -2.80 
Log GDP -.1446 *** -3.70 -.1214 ** -3.13 -.0569 -1.41 
Var (_cons) .0946  .0891  .0827  
Var (residual) .4052  .3937  .3822  
N (cases) 71,475  62,362  44,526  
N (countries) 53  51  40  
ICC .2160      
L1 R2 .0128  .0193  .0206  
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001 
Table 2: Coefficients from the 2-Level Regression of National Pride on Individual-Level Characteristics 
and GDP – Slopes and Intercepts of Education Vary Randomly Across Countries 
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Predictors that most clearly and consistently influence national pride are, in the first 
model, education, satisfaction with one's financial situation, marital status, and age. The gender 
of the respondent tends not to have a significant effect on national pride. Education, satisfaction 
with financial situation, employment status, and age all influence national pride negatively.
3
 
Only being married consistently increases national pride in this model. One standard deviation 
increase in education decreases the standard deviation of national pride by 0.0480. 
In the second model, adding the number of children, religiosity, and income to the 
equation decreases the number of respondents and countries, but the additional variables do not 
change the effect of education, being married, financial satisfaction, or age. Being male also 
becomes significant and has a positive effect on national pride, as does having children and being 
religious. Income does not have an effect, and GDP has a significant and negative effect on 
national pride in this model. 
In Model 3 adding subjectively determined class, savings in the past year, and having an 
immigrant mother or father further decreases the number of observations and countries. Being 
religious and having children mostly increase national pride, as does being male and being 
married.  
In Model 3 GDP does not have a significant effect for the national pride variable. The 
addition of several variables dilutes the effect of the GDP, possibly because some of them are 
related to economic conditions of the respondent. Repeating the analysis casewise, in other 
words, running Model 1 with Model 3 number of cases and Model 1 with Model 2 number of 
cases, does not change the significances or the coefficients substantially. The coefficients are 
almost the same. These results indicate that the models are robust and fewer cases do not detract 
                                                 
3
 The effect of age is curvilinear – negative up to about age 22, then positive. That can be explained by the notion 
that older people tend to have more traditional values than younger people and national pride is considered a 
traditional value (Inglehart 1997, Inglehart and Baker 2000). 
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from the findings, but that perhaps adding more variables has a slightly diluting effect. In the 
original Model 3 log GDP is on the border of insignificance, in the corresponding casewise 
model it is barely significant at p<.05. 
Employment, income, savings, and having an immigrant father do not have significant 
effects; however having an immigrant mother is significant and influences national pride 
negatively in Model 3. Other outcome variables relating to immigration and attitudes toward 
immigrants are examined in Chapter V. 
The Intra-class Correlation Coefficient as a measure of homogeneity indicates that there 
is approximately 22 percent of variation in national pride between countries and approximately 
78 percent can be attributed to variations within countries. The level 1 r-squared (proportional 
reduction in individual-level variance) explains how much level 1 variance is explained by 
level 1 variables. Although the percentages in the models are fairly small, the effects of many of 
the independent variables are statistically significant. Interestingly, adding children, religiosity, 
and income into the equation makes bigger difference than the subsequent addition of savings, 
social class, and the immigrant status of the parents of the respondent. 
National Pride Scale 
The results of the multi-level modeling for the national pride scale variable, summarized 
in Table 3, are in many ways similar to the results of the analyses of national pride. Being male 
and married and having children increases national pride, as does being religious. Age has a 
curvilinear effect. Education decreases national pride but is not significant for this dependent 
variable. Higher income and financial satisfaction decrease national pride, and GDP also lowers 
national pride and its effect is significant in all three models. One standard deviation increase in 
education decreases the standard deviation of the national pride scale by 0.020. 
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Overall, GDP influences the national pride scale variable more strongly than the national 
pride variable. The effect of education on national pride is significant for the national pride 
variable, and not significant for the national pride scale variable. More educated people have 
lower national pride on average, but when national pride is combined with other variables (the 
feelings of belonging to local or national communities) in the scale, the effect is not as 
pronounced – it points in the same direction, but is not statistically significant. That implies that 
educated people might have lower national pride, but could still feel attached to their immediate 
or national communities. 
National Pride Scale 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 b z b z b z 
Sex (Male) .0061 1.07 .0250 *** 4.10 .0248 *** 3.59 
Married .0485 *** 7.46 .0375 *** 5.22 .0388 *** 4.77 
Employed -.0036 -.53 -.0015 -.21 .0019 .23 
Age -.0017 -1.7 -.0019 -1.75 -.0016 -1.32 
Age2 .0001 *** 5.90 .0001 *** 4.82 .0001 *** 3.99 
Education -.0069 -1.82 -.0040 -1.02 -.0041 -1.16 
Financial Satisfaction -.0202 *** -16.55 -.0189 *** -13.64 -.0159 *** -9.66 
Children   .0065 ** 2.97 .0074 ** 2.92 
Religiosity   .1728 *** 23.83 .1757 *** 20.61 
Income   -.0043 ** -2.72 -.0041 * -2.05 
Savings     .0090 * 2.27 
Social Class     .0156 *** 3.55 
Father Immigrant       -.0459 * -2.13 
Mother Immigrant       -.0401  -1.87 
Log GDP -.1940 *** -4.66 -.1747 *** -4.31 -.1272 ** -3.18 
Var (_cons) .1062  .0982  .0820  
Var (residual) .5497  .5315  .4937  
N (cases) 72,811  63,396  45,387  
N (countries) 53  51  40  
ICC .2025      
L1 R
2
 .0141  .0222  .0249  
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001 
Table 3: Coefficients from the 2-Level Regression of National Pride Expressed as a Composite 
Scale on Individual-Level Characteristics and GDP – Slopes and Intercepts of Education 
Vary Randomly Across Countries 
The results for the ICC and the L1R2 for the national pride scale are very similar to the 
results for the national pride as a separate variable. The Intra-class Correlation Coefficient as a 
measure of homogeneity indicates that there is approximately 20 percent of variation in national 
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pride between countries and approximately 80 percent can be attributed to variations within 
countries. The L1 r-squared (proportional reduction in individual-level variance) explains how 
much level 1 variance is explained by level 1 variables. Although the percentages in the models 
are fairly small, the effects of many of the independent variables are statistically significant. 
Adding children, religiosity, and income into the equation makes bigger difference than the 
subsequent addition of savings, social class, and the immigrant status of the parents of the 
respondent. 
Interactions 
Overall, higher education and SES make people less nationalistic on average, i.e. they 
have lower national pride. It is necessary to emphasize that this finding pertains to individuals. 
The main focus of my work is to explore how the relationship of education and national pride is 
affected by contextual variables, in other words, variables measured on the level of whole 
countries. The reasoning behind the consideration of the macro-structural variables is as follows: 
Each individual, educated, or uneducated, with a high or a low SES also possesses a certain 
"base" or "background" level of a set of characteristics unique to his or her country, and that set 
is, statistically speaking, the same for every individual in that particular country. 
The micro/macro structural relationship which is the focus of my research must be 
studied across countries, and can be best expressed statistically by using interaction terms within 
the multilevel models. Interaction terms reveal how the values of one variable change on 
different levels of another variable – in the present study those would be the contextual variables 
of the second level. In one-level models interaction terms can help answer the question how 
educational levels of individuals differ, for example, for different genders or age groups. In 
multilevel models the interaction terms can explain how, for example, the effect of education on 
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national pride is influenced by GDP. The influence can be facilitating (making the relationship in 
whichever direction more pronounced), or inhibiting. 
Democracy is another example of a contextual variable used in an interaction term. 
Depending on various aspects of democracy (e.g., freedom of speech, free elections, or multiple 
political parties) each country is assigned a level of democracy represented by a number.
4
 While 
performing the multilevel analyses, the democracy level is considered the same for each 
individual in that country. To illustrate, Britain has a level of democracy 7 (the highest score), 
Mexico 6, India 5.5, and China 1.5. 
The analyses summarized in Tables 4 through 11 are used to test the hypotheses about 
how the relationship between education and national pride is influenced by eight aggregate 
variables (Hypothesis 3): GDP, Human Development Index (HDI), democracy, ethnic, linguistic 
and religious homogeneity, self-expression, and secularity. The tables also show the average 
effect of the contextual (level 2) variables on national pride. For clarity and brevity, the tables 
present only a subset of predictors - other individual variables are not listed, yet are included in 
the models as shown in Tables 2 and 3 (the same subsets of variables are used for each model).  
The number of cases in the multilevel models range from 42,827 cases in 38 countries 
(for linguistic homogeneity and the national pride variable) to 72,811 cases in 53 countries (for 
GDP and the national pride scale variable). 
Detailed Results for Aggregate Variables 
Each aggregate variable's effect is analyzed separately as to avoid problems with 
collinearity. 
                                                 
4
 In my research the democracy variable was created from the civil liberties score and the political rights score 
(Freedom House 2011). 
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GDP 
On average, both GDP and education lower national pride across countries. The addition 
of the interaction term between education and GDP provides more in-depth explanation of the 
relationship between education, GDP, and national pride. The cross-interaction term is 
statistically significant at the 0.001 level and can be interpreted that, following my hypotheses, 
the negative effect of education on national identity pride is stronger in richer countries; in other 
words, higher GDP facilitates the negative effect of education on national pride. To illustrate, 
consider the effect in a very poor country with a GDP of $500 per person per year, and in a very 
rich country with a GDP of $30,000 per person per year. Calculating the predicted effect of 
education shows that the negative effect is actually 156 percent stronger in the richer country. As 
shown in Table 4, the coefficient for education in Model 1 is b = -.0129, and the coefficient for 
the interaction term between education and log GDP is -.0120. 
For the composite variable of national pride, the effects and relationship between 
education, GDP, and national identity are not as consistent, but the direction of the influence is 
the same. GDP lowers the national pride scale and is significant. The interaction term between 
GDP and education is significant, and facilitates the negative effect of education on national 
identity in richer countries. In other words, the negative effect of education on national identity is 
stronger in countries with higher GDP. 
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National Pride 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b z b z b z 
Education -.0129 *** -4.09 -.0106 ** -3.36 -.0139 *** -4.91 
Log GDP -.1343 ** -3.42 -.1257 ** -3.24 -.0990 * -2.39 
Interaction Term: 
Education x Log GDP 
-.0120 *** -4.16 -.0105 *** -3.64 -.0118 *** -4.72 
N (cases) 71,475   62,362  44,526  
N (countries) 53   51  40  
National Pride Scale 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer  Model 3: fewest 
 b  z b  z b  z 
Education -.0058 -1.69 -.0034 -.92 -.0038 -1.22 
Log GDP -.1979 *** -4.75 -.1842 *** -4.52 -.1636 *** -3.95 
Interaction Term: 
Education x Log GDP 
-.0109 *** -3.45 -.0096 ** -2.84 -.0098 *** -3.61 
N (cases) 72,811  63,396  45,387  
N (countries) 53  51  40  
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001 
Table 4: Selected Coefficients from Multilevel Regression of National Pride on Education 
and GDP - Slopes and Intercepts of Education Vary Randomly Across Countries with 
Interaction between Education and GDP 
 
Figure 1 illustrates how the effect of education on national identity differs between a 
high-GDP and a low-GDP country. The high-GDP country referenced in the graph is Norway 
(GDP = $48,393 per capita), and the low-GDP country is Ethiopia (GDP = $1,110 per capita). 
The mean GDP is $15, 223 per capita. The graph contains three lines showing that the effect of 
education on national identity is positive for a low-income country, negative on average, and 
negative for a high income country. 
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Figure1: National Pride by Education and Country GDP 
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Human Development Index 
An additive effect similar to the effect of the GDP can be seen in Table 5 for the Human 
Development Index. The HDI facilitates the negative effect of education on national pride. In 
countries with higher Human Development Index (typically more developed, richer countries) 
the negative effect of education on national pride is stronger. Both the interaction term's and the 
HDI's coefficients are also negative and significant for the national pride scale variable. 
National Pride 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b z b z b z 
Education -.0132 *** -3.99 -.0106 ** -3.20 -.0143 *** -4.66 
HDI -.0010 *** -3.87 -.0009 *** -3.51 -.0007 ** -2.64 
Interaction Term: 
Education x HDI -.0001 *** -3.87 -.0007 ** -3.42 -.0007 *** -3.87 
N (cases) 67,672  58,778  43,321  
N (countries) 51  49  39  
National Pride Scale 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b z b z b z 
Education -.0057 -1.56 -.0028 -.71 -.0033 -1.00 
HDI -.0014 *** -5.52 -.0012 *** -5.08 -.0010 *** -4.40 
Interaction Term: 
Education x HDI 
-.0001 ** -2.91 -.0001 * -2.23 -.0000 * -2.27 
N (cases) 69,008  59,812  44,182  
N (countries) 51  49  39  
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001 
Table 5: Selected Coefficients from Multilevel Regression of National Pride on 
Education and HDI - Slopes and Intercepts of Education Vary Randomly Across 
Countries with Interaction between Education and HDI 
 
Democracy 
Democracy, on average, reduces feelings of national pride across countries. The effect is 
stronger in more developed countries. The interaction terms are significant in all models for both 
dependent variables, allowing the conclusion that higher levels of democracy facilitate the 
negative effect of education on national pride in more democratic countries as predicted by my 
hypotheses and theoretical outlines. This is true for both the national pride and the national pride 
as a composite scale variable.  
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National Pride 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b z b z b z 
Education -.0125 *** -4.06 -.0104 ** -3.34 -.0102 ** -3.44 
Democracy  -.0527 * -2.07 -.0510 * -2.06 -.0685 * -2.24 
Interaction Term: 
Education x Democracy -.0081 *** -4.62 -.0071 *** -4.08 -.0087 *** -4.74 
N (cases) 70,347  61,377  44,526  
N (countries) 52  50  40  
National Pride Scale 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b z b z b z 
Education -.0056 -1.66 -.0033 -.90 -.0003 -.08 
Democracy  -.0846 ** -3.13 -.0808 ** -3.12 -.1031 ** -3.22 
Interaction Term: 
Education x Democracy  
-.0076 *** -3.92 -.0064 ** -3.08 -.0083 *** -4.43 
N (cases) 71,683  62,411  45,387  
N (countries) 52  50  40  
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001 
Table 6: Selected Coefficients from Multilevel Regression of National Pride on 
Education and Democracy - Slopes and Intercepts of Education Vary Randomly 
Across Countries with Interaction between Education and Democracy 
 
Secularity 
Table 7 describes the multilevel model that includes the interaction between secularity 
and education. Secularity on the level of countries is significant and negative, but it shows mixed 
results for the interaction term; however, even when insignificant, its negative direction supports 
the hypothesis that in more secular countries the negative influence of education on national 
pride is stronger. The processes that cause the mixed results might not be reflected fully in this 
particular multilevel model. Inglehart's secularity and self-expression scales (Inglehart 1997, 
Inglehart and Baker 2000) have been criticized (Haller 2002) for methodological inconsistencies 
and they might not be best suited for the examination of the relationship between education and 
national identity across countries, but even if imperfect, they are necessary to include as 
expressions of post-materialist values since national pride is a traditional and materialist value, 
and, therefore, almost an opposite conceptually. Moreover, religiosity as an individual 
characteristic is statistically significant in all models and raises national pride which points to the 
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importance of religion for national identity. As for the reasons for the irregular results, secularity 
as a scale might not reflect, for example, religious diversity, types of denominations, and the size 
of various religious groups in a given country which are considered important in determining 
national identity (Kunovich 2006). 
National Pride 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b z b z b z 
Education -.0138 *** -3.88 -.0108 ** -3.09 -.0139 *** -4.29 
Secularity (SEC) -.2669 *** -8.73 -.2426 *** -7.64 -.2070 *** -5.24 
Interaction Term: 
Education x SEC -.0054 -1.50 -.0065 -1.90 -.0091 ** -2.76 
N (cases) 70,003  60,938  43,234  
N (countries) 52  50  39  
National Pride Scale 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer  Model 3: fewest 
 b z b z b z 
Education -.0064 -1.70 -.0036 -.90 -.0037 -1.07 
Secularity (SEC) -.2923 *** -7.98 -.2632 *** -7.09 -.2332 *** -5.54 
Interaction Term: 
Education x SEC 
-.0049 -1.30 -.0050 -1.27 -.0059 -1.67 
N (cases) 71,328  61,963  44,088  
N (countries) 52  50  39  
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001 
Table 7: Selected Coefficients from Multilevel Regression of National Pride on  
Education and Secularity - Slopes and Intercepts of Education Vary Randomly  
Across Countries with Interaction between Education and Secularity 
 
Self-Expression 
The possible methodological flaws of Inglehart's scales do not, however, seem to be as 
determining in the analysis involving self-expression.
5
 The interaction terms including self-
expression and education are significant in all three models for national pride, and in two out of 
three models for the national pride scale. These results confirm the hypothesis that in countries 
with higher self-expression levels there is a stronger negative effect of education on national 
pride than in countries with lower self-expression levels. Self-expression is a non-traditional, 
post-materialist characteristic that contrasts with the traditional values associated with national 
                                                 
5
 The correlation between self-expression and secularity is 0.1553. 
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pride. Educated people in countries with strong self-expression values tend to reject feelings of 
national pride. 
The national pride scale coefficients are negative and significant for the interaction term 
in two out of the three models, but not for the separate self-expression as an aggregate, macro 
variable. That suggests, on average, a weak influence of the self-expression scale on the 
relationship between education and national pride for this variable across countries, albeit still in 
the predicted direction. 
National Pride 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b z b z b z 
Education -.0133 *** -4.15 -.0112 ** -3.41 -.0138 *** -4.23 
Self-Expression 
Scale (SESc) .0311 0.69 .0338 .76 .0500 1.04 
Interaction Term: 
EducationxSESc -.0121 *** -4.00 -.0102 ** -3.31 -.0088 ** -2.78 
N (cases) 70,003  60,938  43,234  
N (countries) 52  50  39  
National Pride Scale 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b z b z b z 
Education -.0062 -1.72 -.0040 -1.02 -.0038 -1.09 
Self-Expression 
Scale (SESc) 
-.0131 -.26 -.0080 -.16 .0049 .09 
Interaction Term: 
EducationxSESc 
-.0100 ** -2.96 -.0082 * -2.25 -.0052 -1.56 
N (cases) 71,328  61,963  44,088  
N (countries) 52  50  39  
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001 
Table 8: Selected Coefficients from Multilevel Regression of National Pride on Education  
and Self-Expression Scale - Slopes and Intercepts of Education Vary Randomly Across  
Countries with Interaction between Education and Self-Expression Scale 
 
Ethnic Homogeneity 
Ethnic homogeneity lowers national pride in all but the two most complex models with 
fewest countries and fewest cases where its effect might be diluted by the addition of more 
independent variables. In general, then, national pride is higher in societies with greater ethnic 
diversity. The interaction term of education with ethnic homogeneity is negative and statistically 
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significant in all three models for national pride. That means that higher ethnic homogeneity (or, 
in other words, lower ethnic diversity), facilitates the negative effect of education on national 
pride. Thus in countries with few ethnic groups the higher educated people have lower national 
pride than in more diverse countries where the competition for power, status, or resources can 
foster stronger group identifications (Bonacich 1972). This finding supports my hypotheses.  
The results for the national scale variable are mixed. The ethnic homogeneity variable 
itself is negative and significant in two out of the three models, but the interaction term is not.  
National Pride 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b z b z b z 
Education -.0134 *** -3.89 -.0106 ** -3.20 -.0147 *** -4.76 
Ethnic Homogeneity 
(EthnoH) -.6136 ** -3.46 -.5409 ** -3.10 -.2980 -1.52 
Interaction Term: 
EducationxEthnoH -.0331 * -2.32 -.0366 ** -2.70 -.0435 *** -3.50 
N (cases) 71,475  62,362  44,526  
N (countries) 53  51  40  
National Pride Scale 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b z b z b z 
Education -.0064 -1.74 -.0036 -.92 -.0043 -1.27 
Ethnic Homogeneity 
(EthnoH) -.0201 ** -3.28 -.5797 ** -2.90 -.3332 -1.54 
Interaction Term: 
EducationxEthnoH -.6735 -1.67 -.0273 -1.73 -.0202 -1.46 
N (cases) 72,811  63,396  45,387  
N (countries) 53  51  40  
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001 
Table 9: Selected Coefficients from Multilevel Regression of National Pride on Education  
and Ethnic Homogeneity - Slopes and Intercepts of Education Vary Randomly Across  
Countries with Interaction between Education and Ethnic Homogeneity 
 
Linguistic Homogeneity 
The results for the aggregate variable of linguistic homogeneity are mixed (analogously, 
one may think of the lack of linguistic diversity). For the national pride variable in two of the 
three models its effects are negative and significant; in other words, linguistic homogeneity 
lowers national pride, possibly due to the lack of competition between groups speaking different 
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languages (when there are few groups as this result suggests). The interaction term is negative 
and significant for the national pride variable, but the results for the national pride scale are, 
again, mixed. The negative effect of education on national pride is thus stronger in more 
linguistically homogenous countries. In such countries the educated people might feel they have 
even less competition for jobs and power, because they mostly compete with members of the 
linguistically same group where the education gives them an advantage to start with. In 
linguistically more diverse countries there might be several groups, and all could have educated 
people, so competition within the country, as well as with immigrants, increases. 
National Pride 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b z b z b z 
Education -.0135 *** -3.79 -.0110 ** -3.14 -.0151 *** -4.66 
Language  
Homogeneity (LingH) -.3549 * -2.07 -.3289 * -1.94 -.2355 -1.34 
Interaction Term: 
EducationxLingH -.0312 * -2.40 -.0272 * -2.14 -.0371 ** -3.33 
N (cases) 69,384  60,450  42,827  
N (countries) 51  49  38  
National Pride Scale 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b  z b  z b  z 
Education -.0069 -1.79 -.0044 -1.09 -.0050 -1.39 
Language  
Homogeneity (LingH) -.4010 * -2.05 -.3502 -1.83 -.2676 -1.39 
Interaction Term: 
EducationxLingH -.0194 -1.38 -.0165 -1.11 -.0179 -1.45 
N (cases) 70,580  61,370  43,587  
N (countries) 51  49  38  
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001 
Table 10: Selected Coefficients from Multilevel Regression of National Pride on Education  
and Language Homogeneity - Slopes and Intercepts of Education Vary Randomly Across  
Countries with Interaction between Education and Language Homogeneity 
 
Religious Homogeneity 
The results of the analyses including religious homogeneity are the most uneven ones. 
Although on individual-level religiosity has a significant and positive effect on education, on the 
country-level religious homogeneity is not significant, and the interaction terms are not 
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significant for either national pride variable, or the national pride scale variable. From prior 
literature (Kunovich 2006) it is obvious that the role religion plays in the levels of national pride 
is very complicated – dependent on the size and number of religions in a country, types of 
denominations, and other factors. The results of my analysis seem to suggest that religious 
homogeneity on the country level as one variable does not capture the depth of relationships that 
are involved.  
National Pride 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b z b z b z 
Education -.0141 *** -3.85 -.0113 ** -3.14 -.0142 *** -4.02 
Religious  
Homogeneity (ReligH) .2192 1.07 .2337 1.14 .1227  .59 
Interaction Term: 
Education x ReligH .0000 .00 -.0047 -.31 -.0126  -.88 
N (cases) 70,487  61,498  43,739   
N (countries) 52  50  39   
National Pride Scale 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b z b z b z 
Education -.0071 -1.84 -.0043  -1.06 -.0043  -1.20 
Religious  
Homogeneity (ReligH) .1859 .79 .1886  .81 .0959  .42 
Interaction Term: 
Education x ReligH -.0004 -.02 -.0008  -.05 -.0135  -.94 
N (cases) 71,684  62,419   44,499   
N (countries) 52  50   39   
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001 
Table 11: Selected Coefficients from Multilevel Regression of National Pride on Education  
and Religious Homogeneity - Slopes and Intercepts of Education Vary Randomly Across  
Countries with Interaction between Education and Religious Homogeneity 
To verify the strengths of the results, I ran the multilevel analyses for the Model 1 with 
Models 2 and 3's cases, respectively. Overall, the results are in line with the original analysis and 
support my hypotheses. Neither control for other variables nor the smaller sample eliminates the 
significance of the interaction terms and the results are robust and not sensitive to the changes in 
sample sizes or to adding variables.  
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Missing Values 
Variables used in this chapter do not have extraordinarily high levels of missing values; 
where the numbers of cases and numbers of countries go down, it is because particular batteries 
of questions were not asked in every country. Such items were used when adding variables to 
Models 2 and 3, as to obscure the results in the least possible way. However, even with 
diminished numbers of cases and diminished numbers of countries case-wise analyses show that 
the lower numbers did not influence the robustness of the results. Future research should 
consider biases with regard to countries that are being skipped during the World values Surveys. 
Discussion 
The hypotheses I present in this dissertation have not been systematically tested before. 
Existing literature, although addressing similar topics, overwhelmingly uses theoretical 
approaches, limited-scope comparative analyses, or case studies, but not world-wide samples to 
determine the relationships between education, national identity, and economic development.  
Hypothesis 1: The micro-structural hypothesis. The results of my analyses support the 
hypothesis that education significantly influences national pride. Education has, on average, a 
negative effect on the levels of national pride across countries.
6
 This finding is consistent with 
prior studies (Bonacich 1972, Bollen and Medrano 1998, Smith and Kim 2006, and 
Inglehart 2008). While one cannot say from looking at the statistical results which countries 
exactly might be possible exceptions (and where education would influence national pride in a 
positive way), when considering subsequent analyses it is clear that the negative influence of 
education is more pronounced in developed countries which leaves developing countries with 
weaker, if any, negative influence of education on national pride as outlined in the theory 
                                                 
6
 National pride is used as a measure of national identity following prior literature (e.g., Gaber 2006), as outlined in 
the methods section.  
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chapter. Although some scholars (Hechter 1987, Hroch 1993) assume a positive effect of 
education on national pride, my empirical analysis does not support it. The theoretically-
described positive effect can be implied, however, indirectly for poorer countries, and it certainly 
cannot be ruled out entirely. 
The results for the national pride scale variable point in the same direction of influence, 
but they are not consistently significant. As outlined in the results section, the make-up of the 
scale is the likely cause. 
Hypothesis 2: the macro-structural hypothesis. On the micro-structural level, education 
influences national pride, on average, negatively. On the macro-structural level I observe several 
different results concerning the aggregate variables. GDP, the Human Development Index, and 
democracy clearly and strongly support the initial hypothesis. Existing studies, although usually 
limited in scope, also point in this direction (Inglehart 1970, 1977, 1990, 2008, Bollen and 
Medrano 1998, Inglehart and Baker 2000, Jones and Smith 2001, and Kunovich 2009). All three 
macro-structural variables with the most robust results are related to economic development, 
and/or social development in general, including political and civil liberties. Jones and Smith 
(2001) and Kunovich (2009) come to similar conclusions on the relationship between democracy 
and national identity as I do.  
The secularity variable also has significant and negative results. Inglehart's secularity and 
self-expression scales (Inglehart 1997, Inglehart and Baker 2000) have been criticized 
(Haller 2002) for methodological inconsistencies and they might not be best suited for the 
examination of the relationship between education and national identity across countries, but 
even if imperfect, they are necessary to include as expressions of post-materialist values since 
national pride is a traditional and materialist value, and, therefore, almost an opposite 
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conceptually. Moreover, religiosity as an individual characteristic is statistically significant in all 
models and raises national pride which points to the importance of religion for national identity. 
As for the reasons for the irregular results, secularity as a scale might not reflect, for example, 
religious diversity, types of denominations, and the size of various religious groups in a given 
country which are considered important in determining national identity (Kunovich 2006). 
The results for ethnic homogeneity are mixed, analogously to Kunovich (2009). Another 
variable with mixed results is linguistic homogeneity. In theory, ethnic and linguistic 
fragmentation should reduce national identity by privileging smaller-group cohesion over 
national identification. My results offer support for this theory in agreement with Jones and 
Smith (2001) who look at linguistic diversity in Spain, among other factors.  
The self-expression scale is not significant on the macro-structural level. At least a partial 
explanation might be found in Inglehart's (2008) claim that although countries do develop 
economically in the same direction, their paths are not convergent, but are culturally-dependent. 
That resonates with the more ambiguous results for aggregate variables related to culture and 
their connections to national pride that are exhibited in my research, as well as in Kunovich 
(2009). 
My analyses were run separately for each level 2 variable to avoid multicollinearity 
issues. However, it is interesting to note that in a trial multilevel run that included all contextual 
variables, or various combinations thereof, the values-related scales (secularity and self-
expression scales) had the most consistently statistically significant effects, followed by logged 
GDP that was on the margin of being significant at p=.05. 
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Hypothesis 3: On the combined micro-macro level GDP, HDI, and democracy influence 
the relationship between education and national pride by pushing it into the negative, in other 
words, facilitating the negative effect. To summarize:  
GDP: The interaction term between GDP and education is significant, and is facilitating 
the negative effect of education on national identity in richer countries. In other words, the 
negative effect of education on national identity is stronger in countries with higher GDP for 
both the national pride and the national pride scale variables. 
Human Development Index: In countries with higher Human Development Index 
(typically more developed, richer countries) the negative effect of education on national pride is 
stronger for both national pride and the national pride scale variables. 
Democracy: The level of democracy also facilitates the negative effect of education on 
national pride in more democratic countries as predicted by my hypotheses and theoretical 
outlines. This is true for both the national pride and the national pride as a composite scale 
variable.  
Secularity: Secularity shows mixed results for the interaction term; however, its negative 
direction supports the hypothesis that in more secular countries the negative influence of 
education on national pride is stronger, at least for the national pride variable. The interaction 
term is not significant for the national pride scale. 
Self-Expression: The interaction term including self-expression and education is 
significant in all three models for national pride, and in two out of three models for the national 
pride scale. That means that in countries with higher self-expression levels there is a stronger 
negative effect of education on national pride. These findings are consistent with Inglehart's 
classification and theoretical framework on materialist and post-materialist values. Increased 
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education and financial satisfaction decrease national pride, reflecting the fact that, as Inglehart 
says, people with those characteristics do not need to worry about their material survival as 
much, and creativity, freedom, and self-expression become more important to them. 
Ethnic Homogeneity: The interaction term of education with ethnic homogeneity is 
negative and statistically significant in all three models for the national pride variable. Thus in 
countries with few ethnic groups the higher educated people have lower national pride than in 
more diverse countries where the competition for power, status, or resources can foster stronger 
group identifications (Bonacich 1972). The results for the national scale variable are mixed.  
Linguistic Homogeneity: The interaction term is negative and significant for the national 
pride variable, but the results for the national pride scale are, again, mixed. The negative effect of 
education on national pride is stronger in more linguistically homogenous countries. 
Religious Homogeneity: The interaction terms are not significant for either national 
pride variable. From prior literature (Kunovich 2006) it is obvious that the role religion plays in 
the levels of national pride is very complicated – dependent on the size and number of religions 
in a country, types of denominations, and other factors. The results of my analysis seem to 
suggest that religious homogeneity on the country level as one variable does not capture the 
depth of relationships that are involved.  
Existing literature on the topic of national identity usually does not take into account 
multiple levels of the factors that influence it with a few notable exceptions (Bollen and 
Medrano 1998, Inglehart 2008, Kunovich 2009). Inglehart (2008) provides an explanation of the 
shift from traditional, or materialist, values, of which national pride is an example, to post-
materialist values, represented in my analysis by the secularity and self-expression scales on 
level 2. My results fit in well with Inglehart's assumptions that the level of economic 
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development influences value-shifts in society because my analyses suggest that higher GDP 
pushes the education's effect on national pride toward the negative in countries on higher level of 
economic development. Inglehart's studies on values are quantitative yet he does not employ a 
multilevel analysis, but rather a combination of comparative research, cohort analysis, and an 
examination of trends (Inglehart 2008). 
Although Bollen and Medrano (1998) employ multilevel analysis in their study of 
national identity on the level of different regions in Spain, and not on cross-national data, my 
results (in the areas where our research overlaps) are very similar to theirs. The authors report 
that on the individual level, education lowers national identity; and on the second regional level, 
there is a negative, statistically significant effect of the interaction term between education and 
levels of economic development on the attachment to Spain.  
The main limitation of my study is the fact that not all countries of the world participate 
in the World Values Surveys, and of those who do, not every question is asked in every country 
which limits the number of countries available for analysis. Thus out of the 195 independent 
states in the world (Department of State 2011) the data for my analysis was available for only 57. 
On the other hand, that number is higher than for most of other cross-national studies, especially 
considering the topic. 
Conclusions 
In this chapter I have shown that people's national identity is influenced by micro and 
macro-structural factors, and that certain aggregate variables, especially those related to the 
levels of economic development, human development, and democracy, have a facilitating 
(additive) effect on the negative influence of education on national pride that pushes this 
relationship even more into the negative territory for wealthier, more developed nations. Thus 
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the influence of GDP, HDI, and democracy on the relationship between education and national 
identity is predictable across nations.  
The existing theoretical views on the positive influence of education on national pride are 
not supported, yet are impossible to dismiss at this point because with careful consideration there 
are patterns in the statistical examinations that seem to suggest that for poorer countries the 
possible positive influence of education on national pride weakens the overall negative effect for 
the national pride scale variable. 
I recommend that future research concentrates on deeper assessments of the roles of 
cultural (ethnic, linguistic, religious, and materialistic and post-materialistic values-oriented) 
macro-structural factors that can provide fine-tuning of the predictions for the above mentioned 
relationships. Multilevel modeling is an excellent tool to do so. 
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CHAPTER IV – ANALYSIS: ETHNIC AND CIVIC 
COMPONENTS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY 
In this chapter, I compare the results of the analyses from Chapter III to analyses for 
different dependent variables that express the two dimensions of national identity – ethnic and 
civic, and for national identity in itself (as a combined variable). The method used is analogous 
to the method used in Chapter III, except for the number of dependent variables (three instead of 
two). First, I consider the effects of education on all three variables of national identity, then the 
effects of the eight country-level characteristics on national identity, and, finally, the effects of 
these macro-structural variables on the relationship between education and national identity 
using multilevel models with interactions included. This process deepens the understanding of 
conceptual relationships that exist between education, national identity, and the country-level 
characteristics. 
Many social scientists employ the ethnic and civic categories in describing the national 
identity content. The distinct concepts of the ethnic and the civic components of national identity 
were first introduced by Kohn (1944) who was writing about different types of national identity 
and nationalism in the countries of Eastern and Western Europe. Since then the strictly 
geographical understanding of these terms has been blurred and the concepts are generally 
understood as present in countries, groups, and people at the same time in various degrees 
(Smith 1991, Hobsbawm [1990] 1992, Jones and Smith 2001, Pehrson, Vignoles, and 
Brown 2009, Meeus et al. 2010). Thus the ethnic / civic distinctions are not mutually exclusive 
and can coexist within one country (Hjerm 1998, Pehrson, Vignoles, and Brown 2009). 
The ethnic (ascriptive) component of national of national identity describes common 
ancestry of a group of people and/or the importance they place on it. Smith (1992, 1998) derives 
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national identification of the ethnic kind (which he privileges) from his own concept of ancient 
"ethnies" in his ethno-symbolic perspective. Overall, the ethnic dimension of national identity is 
usually approached on the basis of exclusion – for example when people are not sharing common 
ancestry with the national group, they can never become a part of it. The exclusion/inclusion 
principle comes from social psychology and its concepts of in-groups and out-groups as relating 
to collective identity (Tajfel 1982, Turner 1985, Tajfel and Turner 1986). Extending these ideas 
to national identity results in the exclusion / inclusion dichotomy (Meeus et al. 2010, Pehrson 
and Green 2010), and the defining of the ethnic and civic components of national identity as 
ascriptive or, respectively, voluntaristic.  
The voluntaristic or civic dimension can be explained as behavior and attitudes that 
people can influence – such as following laws and customs of their country or national group, or 
an adopted country. The civic form or dimension of national identity emphasizes inclusion that 
can be achieved regardless of one's ancestry. Many Western industrialized nations exemplify this 
concept by allowing people not born in the country to become naturalized citizens.  
The different forms of national identity – ethnic and civic – may respond differently to 
education and economic development than national identity expressed by national pride alone, as 
examined in Chapter III. While existing literature indicates that education lowers national 
identity in general, many social scientists point out that with regard to the ethnic and civic 
dimensions, educated people (assuming greater cognitive skills) favor the civic form of national 
identity over the ethnic one (Bollen and Medrano 1998, Jones and Smith 2001, Kunovich 2009). 
Jones and Smith also relate the preference for the civic content to higher levels of economic 
development, and Kunovich (2009) confirms this result and adds higher levels of democracy to 
contextual variables shifting the preferences to the civic form. 
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I hypothesize that education influences the ethnic and civic components of national 
identity separately and together; on average the relationship should be negative, and weaker for 
the civic form. However, this effect can vary depending on contextual variables: higher 
economic development, human development and democracy should lower national identity, but 
more so for the ethnic than the civic dimension.  
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Results 
Table 12 describes means and sample sizes of the individual- and country-level variables 
used in the analysis in this chapter. 
Variable (Type) N (Indiv.) N (Ctry.) Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variables 
Ethnic Component of NI 
(composite scale) 61,753 45 2.05 .78 1 3 
Civic Component of NI 
(composite scale) 61,956 45 2.55 .52 1 3 
National Identity  
(composite scale) 62,247 45 2.31 .53 1 3 
Importance of Ancestry  
(used in scales) 61,150 45 2.01 .85 1 3 
Importance of Being Born 
in Country (used in scales) 59,315 44 2.10 .84 1 3 
Importance of Following 
Customs (used in scales) 61,521 45 2.40 .70 1 3 
Importance of Respecting 
Laws (used in scales) 61,753 45 2.71 .53 1 3 
Independent Variables (Individual Level) 
Marital Status 82,731 57 .63 .48 0 1 
Number of Children 77,692 57 1.92 1.84 0 8 
Financial Satisfaction 78,921 57 5.22 2.47 1 10 
Religiosity 80,039 57  .70  .46 0 1 
Father immigrant 60,501 44  .06  .25 0 1 
Mother immigrant 60,568 44 .07  .25 0 1 
Sex 82,896 57  .48  .50  0 1 
Age 82,725 57 41.41  16.48 15 98 
Age Squared 82,725 57 1,986.89 1,533.84 225 9,604 
Education 82,408 57 5.25  2.50 1 9 
Employed 79,652 55 .60  .49 0 1 
Savings in the Past Year 72,632 52 2.87  .93  1 4 
Income 74,680 55 4.58  2.31 1 10 
Social Class 68,901 50 2.61  .97 1 4 
Independent Variables (Country Level) 
GDP 82,992 57 16,458.07 13,021.46 1,110 48,393 
Human Development Index 
(HDI) 79,064 55 807.8 154.36 361 968 
Democracy (composite 
scale) 81,740 56 5.51 1.68 1.5 7 
Political Rights  
(used for scale creation) 81,740 56 2.54 1.89 1 7 
Civil Liberties 
(used for scale creation) 81,740 56 2.45 1.52 1 6 
Secularity (scale) 81,492 56 -.25 1.01 -1.94 1.96 
Self -Expression (scale) 81,492 56 .10 1.06 -1.68 2.35 
Ethnic Homogeneity 82,992 57 .61 .24 .22 1 
Language Homogeneity 80,265 55 .65 .27 .13 1 
Religious Homogeneity 81,772 56 .54 .24 .14 1 
Table 12: Descriptive Statistics of Individual-Level and Country-Level Variables Used in Chapter IV Analysis 
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The dependent variables are the ethnic and the civic components of national identity and 
the combined national identity variable. All three dependent variables are scales and their values 
range from 1 to 3 (with 3 being the highest national identity). The ethnic and civic component 
scales each contain two items based on the answer to the question:  
In your opinion, how important should the following be as requirements for 
somebody seeking citizenship of your country? Specify for each requirement if 
you consider it as very important, rather important, or not important: 
a. Having ancestors from my country 
b. Being born on my country’s soil 
c. Adopting the customs of my country 
d. Abiding by my country’s laws 
Items a) and b) are used to create the ethnic dimension of national identity; items c) and 
d) its civic dimension. Additionally, I use a combined dependent variable called national identity 
that includes all four items. Cronbach's alphas (unstandardized items) are as follows: Ethnic: 
0.8241, civic: 0.5967, combined (national identity): 0.6837. The ethnic component of national 
identity scale has 61,753 cases in 45 countries, the civic component 61,956 cases in 45 countries, 
and the combined national identity variable has 62,247 cases in 45 countries. 
It is evident from Table 12 that the civic component of the national identity has the 
highest mean (2.55) and is the strongest across the nations in my sample. National identity as a 
composite scale follows (2.31); the ethnic component is the weakest (2.05). Based on these 
values one can speculate that education and the contextual variables might not have as much 
effect on the civic component of the national identity as on the other two dependent variables 
because most people strongly agree on them. 
For independent variables, the variable describing sex has the most cases (82,896), and 
the GDP has the most cases on the contextual level (82,992), both in 57 countries. On level 1, the 
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least number of cases is observed for the immigrant status of the father of the respondent (60,501 
in 44 countries), and on level 2 for the Human Development Index (79,064 in 55 countries).  
The analyses are run for three different sets of variables and cases. The first model has 
the most countries and cases, but fewer independent variables. As individual-level variables are 
added, the numbers of countries and cases decline because of missing values. The first model 
includes basic demographic variables: sex, marital status, employment status, age (and age 
squared), education (as the independent variable), and satisfaction with the financial status of the 
household in the past year. In the second model the number of children, religiosity, and income 
are added. For the third model savings (or lack thereof), subjectively determined social class, and 
immigrant status of the respondent's parents are also considered. 
To preview, the results of the multilevel analyses support the hypotheses outlined in 
Chapter I and in the beginning of this chapter. Education tends to have, on average, a negative 
influence on the measures of national identity. The theories that posit that education has a 
positive effect on national identity are not supported overall, but the average may hide diversity 
across countries. GDP facilitates the negative effect of education on national identity for the 
ethnic component of national identity, and for national identity as a combined scale. Other 
contextual variables show mixed results. Ethnic homogeneity also facilitates the negative effect 
of education; in other words, in countries that are more ethnically homogenous education 
influences national identity more negatively than in countries that are diverse. Ethnic diversity 
can be considered as increasing national identity, as outlined in Bonacich (1972). The results for 
the civic component of national identity also support my hypotheses that the ethnic and the civic 
dimensions of national identity are influenced differently by education and that their relationship 
to education is affected differently by the contextual variables – because the civic component is 
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stronger to start with, the overall negative influence in the above described relationships is 
weaker. 
Ethnic Component of National Identity 
Table 13 describes the additive results of the multilevel regression of the ethnic 
component of national identity on individual-level characteristics controlling for the GDP. 
Included in the table are unstandardized coefficients that show the change in national identity for 
a one unit change in a predictor. The z-ratios are used to determine statistical significance at the 
0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels. The analyses are run for three different sets of variables and cases. 
The first model has the most countries and most cases, but fewer individual independent 
variables. As individual-level variables are added, the numbers of countries and cases decline 
because of missing values.  
Ethnic Component of National Identity 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 b z b z b z 
Sex (Male) -.0011 -.18 .0085 1.37 .0090 1.37 
Married -.0027 -.41 -.0072 -.98 -.0081 -1.05 
Employed -.0209 ** -3.05 -.0159 * -2.17 -.0192 * -2.45 
Age -.0040 *** -3.92 -.0045 *** -4.06 -.0056 *** -4.71 
Age2 .0001 *** 4.72 .0001 *** 4.51 .0001 *** 5.14 
Education -.0359 *** -8.44 -.0317 *** -8.13 -.0305 *** -7.52 
Financial Satisfaction -.0033 ** -2.66 -.0064 *** -4.53 -.0070 *** -4.43 
Children   .0062 ** 2.71 .0049 * 1.99 
Religiosity   .0834 *** 10.95 .0813 *** 9.97 
Income   -.0066 *** -4.02 -.0022 -1.16 
Savings     -.0039 -1.04 
Social Class     -.0117 ** -2.78 
Father Immigrant     -.0324 -1.58 
Mother Immigrant     -.0205 -1.00 
Log GDP -.2134 *** -6.05 -.2060 *** -5.68 -.2010 *** -5.75 
Var (_cons) .0636  .0651  .0638  
Var (residual) .4546  .4491  .4447  
N (cases) 58,649  51,180  44,723  
N (countries) 44  42  40  
ICC .2312      
L1 R
2
 .0165  .0194  .0185  
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001 
Table 13: Coefficients from the Multilevel Regression of the Ethnic Component 
of National Identity on Individual-Level Characteristics and GDP – Slopes and  
Intercepts of Education Vary Randomly Across Countries 
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In the first model being employed, being educated, and being financially satisfied all 
decrease the values of the ethnic component of national identity and are statistically significant. 
Age has a curvilinear effect – at first negative and later positive, and GDP has a significantly 
negative effect. The results are similar for the second model except people with greater number 
of children appear more nationalistic, which is also true for those who are more religious. 
Income decreases ethnic national identity and is statistically significant. In Model 3 income and 
savings are not significant (perhaps several variables related to economic status dilute each 
other's effects), but belonging to a higher social class decreases ethnic national identity. Being 
religious, having more children, and older age increase the ethnic component of the national 
identity in this model. One standard deviation increase in education decreases the standard 
deviation of the ethnic component of national identity by 0.1144. 
Sex and marital status are not significant in any of the three models; and education and 
GDP have statistically significant and negative effect in all three models. That means that people  
in richer countries tend to, on average, have lower ethnic national identity. These groups of 
people tend to also be younger, employed, and less religious, and belong to a higher (self-
reported) social class. In Model 3 adding social class dilutes or replaces the effect of income on 
the ethnic component of national identity. 
The Intra-Class Correlation Coefficient as a measure of homogeneity indicates that there 
is approximately 23 percent of variation in the ethnic component of national identity between 
countries and approximately 77 percent can be attributed to variations within countries. The 
level 1 r-squared (proportional reduction in individual-level variance) explains how much level 1 
variance is explained by level 1 variables. Although the percentages in the models are fairly 
small, the effects of many of the independent variables are statistically significant. Perhaps 
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because of the different number of countries and cases, adding children, religiosity, and income 
into the equation makes bigger difference than the subsequent addition of savings, social class, 
and the immigrant status of the parents of the respondent. 
Civic Component of National Identity 
The results for the civic component of the national identity, described in Table 14, are 
slightly different from the results for the ethnic component, but the effect of education stays the 
same – it is negative and statistically significant, even though the coefficients are much smaller 
for the civic component than there are for the ethnic component, as expected. That implies that 
with higher levels of education the civic component of national identity goes lower. However, 
the effect of the GDP, although in the predicted direction, is not statistically significant. The 
effect of religiosity is always negative and significant, as it is in the previous models. 
Satisfaction with financial situation of the household is lowering the civic national identity in all 
three models. Overall, the effects of education on the civic component of national identity are 
less well predicted than the effects on the ethnic one and on the combined one. The ICC is lower, 
at .066, meaning countries differ less, and there are more variables that are not statistically 
significant. 
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Civic Component of National Identity 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 b z b z b z 
Sex (Male) .0249 .58 .0136 ** 2.94 .0126 * 2.53 
Married .0127 ** 2.59 .0082 1.50 .0118 * 2.03 
Employed .0016 .32 .0027 .50 .0099 1.64 
Age .0013 1.69 .0004 .51 -.0001 -.16 
Age2 8.3406 1.05 .0000 1.36 .0000 1.85 
Education -.0059 ** -2.64 -.0049 * -2.12 -.0062 * -2.51 
Financial Satisfaction -.0025 ** -2.67 -.0034 ** -3.20 -.0035 ** -2.94 
Children   .0027 1.59 .0031 1.71 
Religiosity   .0619 *** 10.93 .0594 *** 9.72 
Income   -.0035 ** -2.86 -.0050 ** -3.48 
Savings     -.0027 -.94 
Social Class     .00123 *** 3.90 
Father Immigrant       -.00142  -.92 
Mother Immigrant       -.0035  -.23 
Log GDP -.0239 -1.31 -.0213 -1.18 -.0220 -1.21 
Var (_cons) .0172  .0164  .0171  
Var (residual) .2525  .2500  .2510  
N (cases) 58,585  51,379  44,851  
N (countries) 44  42  40  
ICC .0660      
L1 R
2
 .0063  .0082  .0082  
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001 
Table 14: Coefficients from the Multilevel Regression of the Civic Component of  
National Identity Scale on Individual-Level Characteristics and GDP – Slopes and  
Intercepts of Education Vary Randomly Across Countries 
Since the civic component of national identity indicates how important the respondents 
think it is to follow laws and customs while granting citizenship, it seems that for more educated 
people the civic component does not decrease as much as the ethnic component – i.e., this group 
of people might consider that following the laws and customs, a voluntary behavior, more 
important in determining citizenship than being born in the country or having ancestors from the 
country (which are ascriptive characteristics and cannot be changed by the person applying for 
citizenship). In essence, higher education lowers the feelings of the importance of the ethnic 
component more than that of the civic component. One standard deviation increase in education 
decreases the standard deviation of the civic component of national identity by 0.0282. 
Being religious has a positive effect on the civic component of national identity and it is 
statistically significant. The logged GDP is not statistically significant, but the direction of the 
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results is as predicted – negative; in other words, countries' higher GDP lowers the civic 
component of national identity. Employment status, number of children and savings in the past 
year do not have a significant effect, either. 
The Intra-Class Correlation Coefficient as a measure of homogeneity indicates that there 
is approximately 7 percent of variation in the civic national identity between countries and 
approximately 93 percent can be attributed to variations within countries. The level 1 r-squared 
(proportional reduction in individual-level variance) explains how much level 1 variance is 
explained by level 1 variables. Although the percentages in the models are fairly small, the 
effects of many of the independent variables are statistically significant. Adding children, 
religiosity, and income into the equation makes bigger difference than the subsequent addition of 
savings, social class, and the immigrant status of the parents of the respondent. 
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National Identity – Combined 
The results for the combined national identity variable are in Table 15. 
National Identity (Combined) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 b z b z b z 
Sex (Male) .0005 .12 .0107 * 2.44 .0107 * 2.30 
Married .0043 .93 -.0004 -.07 .0014 .25 
Employed -.0089 -1.85 -.0063 -1.22 -.0049 -.88 
Age -.0013 *** -1.80 -.0020 ** -2.48 -.0028 ** -3.35 
Age2 .0000 *** 3.91 .0008 *** 3.82 .0000 *** 4.56 
Education -.0211 *** -7.44 -.0186 *** -6.74 -.0185 *** -6.48 
Financial Satisfaction -.0027 ** -3.06 -.0047 *** -4.64 -.0050 *** -4.47 
Children   .0048 ** 2.98 .0043 * 2.49 
Religiosity   .0718 *** 13.35 .0697 *** 12.10 
Income   -.0049 *** -4.23 -.0035 * -2.58 
Savings     -.0030 -1.11 
Social Class     .0001 .04 
Father Immigrant       -.0249  -1.72 
Mother Immigrant       -.0115  -.80 
Log GDP -.1169 *** -5.33 -.1111 *** -4.98 -.1106 *** -5.05 
Var (_cons) .0238  .0235  .0228  
Var (residual) .2288  .2254  .2236  
N (cases) 58,836  51,558  44,963  
N (countries) 44  42  40  
ICC .1605      
L1 R
2
 .0156  .0195  .0184  
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001 
Table 15: Coefficients from the Multilevel Regression of the National  
Identity (Combined) on Individual-Level Characteristics and GDP –  
Slopes and Intercepts of Education Vary Randomly Across Countries 
The combined national identity variable shows stronger effects than the civic component 
alone, and very similar results to those of the ethnic component. Overall, age, education, and 
satisfaction with financial situation influence national identity negatively in all three models, and 
higher income also lowers national identity in the last two models. Religiosity, being male, and 
having greater number of children increase national identity. One standard deviation increase in 
education decreases the standard deviation of the national identity combined by 0.1005. GDP has 
a statistically significant and negative effect in all models. Being married, being employed, 
having savings in the past year, and belonging to a higher social class do not show as significant 
in this set of models. Having an immigrant mother or father also does not seem to make a 
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difference. My macro-structural hypothesis is strongly supported by the above described results 
which indicate that national identity is lower in countries on higher levels of economic 
development.  
The Intra-Class Correlation Coefficient as a measure of homogeneity indicates that there 
is approximately 16 percent of variation in the civic national identity between countries and 
approximately 84 percent can be attributed to variations within countries. The level 1 r-squared 
(proportional reduction in individual-level variance) explains how much level 1 variance is 
explained by level 1 variables. Although the percentages in the models are fairly small, the 
effects of many of the independent variables are statistically significant. Adding children, 
religiosity, and income into the equation makes bigger difference than the subsequent addition of 
savings, social class, and the immigrant status of the parents of the respondent. 
Second-Level Variables with Interactions 
Tables 16 through 23 lay out the results of the multilevel analyses with the interaction 
terms included. Level 2 variables used are the same as in Chapter III: GDP, HDI, democracy, 
self-expression, secularity, and ethnic, linguistic, and religious homogeneity. The interaction 
terms include education times each of the level 2 variables, but each interaction term is added to 
a separate model. As explained in Chapter III, studying micro/macro structural relationship 
across countries requires not only multilevel models, but also models that include cross-level 
interaction terms to represent differences across countries in the slopes or effects of the 
individual determinants. Different countries have varying levels of GDP, democracy, and other 
macro-structural characteristics. The macro-structural factors can then facilitate or inhibit the 
effect of education on national identity. The tables illustrate the testing of the hypotheses on the 
combined micro/macro level about how the relationship between education and national identity 
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is influenced by country-level (aggregate) factors. The tables summarize the results and do not 
include complete sets of predictors (as shown in Table 13, Table 14, and Table 15), but the 
models used in the analysis do include all individual variables.  
The number of cases in the multilevel models range from 42,960 in 38 countries (for 
Model 3 of the ethnic component and language homogeneity) to 58,836 in 44 countries (for 
Model 1 of the national identity as a combined variable and democracy as the contextual 
variable).  
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Detailed Results for Aggregate Variables 
Each aggregate variable's effect is analyzed separately to avoid problems with 
collinearity. 
GDP 
Ethnic Component of National Identity 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b z b z b z 
Education -.0355 *** -8.88 -.0317 *** -8.52 -.0304 *** -7.89 
Log GDP -.2286 *** -6.40 -.2213 *** -5.99 -.2240 *** -6.14 
Interaction Term: 
Education x Log GDP 
-.0091 * -2.45 -.0070 * -2.05 -.0073 * -2.11 
N (cases) 58,349  51,180  44,723  
N (countries) 44  42  40  
Civic Component of National Identity 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b z b z b z 
Education -.0058 ** -2.66 -.0049 * -2.17 -.0061 * -2.53 
Log GDP -.0188 -1.00 -.0143 -.77 -.0150 -.79 
Interaction Term: 
Education x Log GDP 
-.0029 -1.46 -.0030 -1.46 -.0026 -1.23 
N (cases) 58,585  51,379  44,851  
N (countries) 44  42  40  
National Identity 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b z b z b z 
Education -.0209 *** -7.79 -.0186 *** -7.04 -.0185 *** -6.75 
Log GDP -.1197 *** -5.46 -.1135 *** -5.09 -.1150 *** -5.23 
Interaction Term: 
Education x Log GDP 
-.0059 * -2.36 -.0049 * -2.02 -.0048 -1.96 
N (cases) 58,836  51,558  44,963  
N (countries) 44  42  40  
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001 
Table 16: Selected Coefficients from Multilevel Regression of National Identity  
on Education and GDP - Slopes and Intercepts of Education Vary Randomly  
Across Countries with Interaction between Education and GDP Included 
Both GDP and education lower national identity across countries. Adding interaction 
term into the multilevel models draws out additional details about this relationship. The 
interaction term between education and GDP is significant at the 0.001 level for the ethnic and 
combined national identity, but not for the civic component of national identity. This can be a 
consequence of the logged GDP not being significant at the macro-structural level for the civic 
component. The lack of a significant interaction suggests that, for the civic component, more 
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educated people are similarly less nationalistic in richer as poorer countries. The construction of 
the civic component scale might also contribute to this result – the civic component includes the 
importance of the willingness to follow the laws and customs of the new country in order to be 
granted citizenship.  
Calculating the predicted levels of national identity in a country with a GDP of $500/year 
and for the GDP of $30,000/year yields the following results: the negative effect of education on 
national identity is 141 percent stronger in richer countries for the ethnic component of national 
identity, and 142 percent stronger in richer countries for the national identity as combined 
variable. The effects of the civic component are not statistically significant. 
Human Development Index 
Table 17 describes the results of the multilevel analyses with the Human Development 
Index as the aggregate variable. The results are inconsistent. The effects of education on the 
ethnic component and the combined national identity scale are significant, but not for the civic 
component of national identity (although pointing in the predicted direction in all models). The 
same is true for the effects of HDI. The interaction terms are not significant in any models. These 
results suggest that the influence of education and the HDI on national identity do not vary 
across different countries. Higher education and higher HDI lower national identity, but HDI 
does not have a facilitating effect on the relationship between education and national identity. 
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Ethnic Component of National Identity 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b  z b  z b  z 
Education -.0356 *** -8.42 -.0317 *** -8.10 -.0304 *** -7.48 
HDI -.0014 *** -5.93 -.0014 *** -5.51 -.0014 *** -5.47 
Interaction Term: 
Education x HDI -.0000  -1.65 -.0000  -1.29 -.0000  -1.31 
N (cases) 57,127  49,964  43,518  
N (countries) 43  41  39  
Civic Component of National Identity 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b  z b  z b  z 
Education -.0062 -2.83 -.0053 * -2.33 -.0065 ** -2.67 
HDI -.0002 .143 -.0001  -1.07 -.0001 -1.14 
Interaction Term: 
Education x HDI -.0000  .189 -.0000  -1.03 -.0000  -.95 
N (cases) 57,363  50,163   43,646  
N (countries) 43  41   39  
National Identity 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b  z b  z b  z 
Education -.0211 *** -7.52 -.0188 *** -6.80 -.0187 *** -6.52 
HDI -.0008 *** -5.37 -.0007 *** -4.88 -.0007 *** -4.93 
Interaction Term: 
Education x HDI -.0000  -1.71 -.0000  -1.31 -.0000  -1.29 
N (cases) 57,614  50,342  43,758  
N (countries) 43  41  39  
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001 
Table 17: Selected Coefficients from Multilevel Regression of National Identity  
on Education and Human Development Index - Slopes and Intercepts of Education  
Vary Randomly Across Countries with Interaction between Education and HDI Included 
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Democracy 
Ethnic Component of National Identity 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b z b z b z 
Education -.0354 *** -8.64 -.0316 *** -8.33 -.0297 *** -7.59 
Democracy -.1154 *** -3.98 -.1102 *** -3.77 -.1293 *** -4.13 
Interaction Term: 
Education x Democracy -.0050  -1.92 -.0038  -1.62 -.0048  -1.89 
N (cases) 58,349  51,180  44,723  
N (countries) 44  42  40  
Civic Component of National Identity 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b z b z b z 
Education -.0057 ** -2.61 -.0048 * -2.11 -.0058 * -2.39 
Democracy -.0164 -1.30 -.0156 -1.26 -.0189 -1.36 
Interaction Term: 
Education x Democracy -.0018  -1.35 -.0019  -1.34 -.0022  -1.42 
N (cases) 58,585  51,379  44,851  
N (countries) 44  42  40  
National Identity 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b z b z b z 
Education -.0208 *** -7.62 -.0185 *** -6.90 -.0180 *** -6.53 
Democracy -.0639 *** -3.81 -.0607 *** -3.67 -.0713 *** -4.04 
Interaction Term: 
Education x Democracy -.0034 ** -1.98 -.0028  -1.69 -.0035 * -1.97 
N (cases) 58,836  51,558  44,963  
N (countries) 44  42  40  
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001 
Table 18: Selected Coefficients from Multilevel Regression of National Pride  
on Education and Democracy - Slopes and Intercepts of Education Vary Randomly  
Across Countries with Interaction between Education and Democracy Included 
When examining countries with varying degrees of democracy, the results are similar to 
those for the Human Development Index. The interaction terms point in the predicted direction, 
but are significant only for the combined national identity variable. The negative effect of 
education is significant in all models. Democracy does not seem to facilitate the negative effect 
of education on national identity. 
Secularity and Self-Expression 
Tables 19 and 20 describe the multilevel analyses for the values-related level 2 variables, 
secularity and self-expression. Both of them are scales from the World Values Survey data. 
There does not appear to be a consistent effect of country-level secularity or self-expression on 
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national identity, except in the case of the civic component of national identity where self-
expression actually facilitates the negative effect of education on the civic portion of national 
identity. In countries where the overall level of self-expression is higher, the negative effect of 
education on the civic component of national identity is stronger. This effect, although 
statistically significant, is, however, not very strong and countered by the generally insignificant 
interactions. 
Ethnic Component of National Identity 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b z b z b z 
Education -.0366 *** -8.47 -.0321 *** -8.18 -.0306 *** -7.51 
Secularity -.2753 *** -7.11 -.2733 *** -7.23 -.2831 *** -7.28 
Interaction Term: 
Education x Secularity -.0014  -.31 -.0027  -.69 -.0040  -.95 
N (cases) 56,923  49,800  43,466  
N (countries) 43  41  39  
Civic Component of National Identity 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b z b z b z 
Education -.0060 ** -2.70 -.0052 * -2.21 -.0062 * -2.47 
Secularity -.0320 -1.59 -.0191 -.95 -.0164 -.77 
Interaction Term: 
Education x Secularity -.0024  -1.02 -.0019  -.82 -.0024  -.97 
N (cases) 57,136  49,977  43,575  
N (countries) 43  41  39  
National Identity 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b z b z b z 
Education -.0215 *** -7.52 -.0188 *** -6.80 -.0186 *** -6.46 
Secularity -.1528 *** -6.80 -.1455 *** -6.52 -.1490 *** -6.47 
Interaction Term: 
Education x Secularity -.0023  -.79 -.0028  -.99 -.0036  -1.22 
N (cases) 57,385  50,155  43,687  
N (countries) 43  41  39  
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001 
Table 19: Selected Coefficients from Multilevel Regression of National Pride  
on Education and Secularity - Slopes and Intercepts of Education Vary Randomly  
Across Countries with Interaction between Education and Secularity Included 
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Ethnic Component of National Identity 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b z b z b z 
Education -.0365 *** -8.77 -.0326 *** -8.41 -.0314 *** -7.72 
Self-Expression -.1722 *** -3.77 -.1675 *** -3.54 -.1805 *** -3.73 
Interaction Term:  
Education x  
Self-Expression -.0072  -1.77 -.0044  -1.17 -.0041  -1.04 
N (cases) 56,923  49,800  43,466  
N (countries) 43  41  39  
Civic Component of National Identity 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b z b z b z 
Education -.0062 ** -2.92 -.0055 ** -2.48 -.0066 ** -2.74 
Self-Expression .0208 1.10 .0210 1.11 .0215 1.08 
Interaction Term: 
Education x  
Self-Expression -.0047 * -2.26 -.0048 * -2.22 -.0049 * -2.12 
N (cases) 57,136  49,977  43,575  
N (countries) 43  41  39  
National Identity 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b z b z b z 
Education -.0216 *** -7.87 -.0193 *** -7.12 -.0191 *** -6.74 
Self-Expression -.0697 * -2.50 -.0669 * -2.36 -.0727 * -2.51 
Interaction Term:  
Education x 
Self-Expression -.0054 * -2.02 -.0040  -1.54 -.0040  -1.47 
N (cases) 57,385  50,155  43,687  
N (countries) 43  41  39  
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001 
Table 20: Selected Coefficients from Multilevel Regression of National Pride on Education  
and Self-Expression - Slopes and Intercepts of Education Vary Randomly Across  
Countries with Interaction between Education and Self-Expression Included 
 
Ethnic Homogeneity 
In Table 21, ethnic homogeneity shows slightly mixed, but not wholly inconsistent, 
results for the interaction term with education. Only one coefficient in this set of equations is not 
statistically significant (the interaction term of education and ethnic homogeneity for the most 
countries and the ethnic component). Higher educated people have, on average, lower levels of 
national identity for the ethnic component of national identity, but higher ethnic homogeneity 
(i.e., lower diversity) facilitates the negative effect of education on national identity. That means 
that higher educated people in more ethnically homogenous countries have lower national 
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identity than higher educated people in more ethnically diverse countries. In other words, 
educational differences in national identity are larger in ethnically homogenous than in diverse 
countries. The results are similar for the civic component of national identity, although the 
coefficients are smaller and the effects weaker. The combined national identity is also negatively 
influenced by education and the effect facilitated by higher ethnic homogeneity 
Ethnic Component of National Identity 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b z b z b z 
Education -.0356 *** -8.58 -.0314 *** -8.39 -.0302 *** -7.82 
Ethnic Homogeneity -.6370 ** -3.11 -.6278 ** -3.08 -.6550 ** -3.16 
Interaction Term: 
Education x Ethnic Homogeneity -.0282 -1.61 -.0318 * -2.07 -.0347 * -2.21 
N (cases) 58,349  51,180  44,723  
N (countries) 44  42  40  
Civic Component of National Identity 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b z b z b z 
Education -.0056 ** -2.63 -.0046 * -2.11 -.0059 * -2.57 
Ethnic Homogeneity -.1047 -1.24 -.0607 -.72 -.0575 -.66 
Interaction Term: 
Education x Ethnic Homogeneity -.0219 * -2.48 -.0224 * -2.52 -.0246 ** -2.68 
N (cases) 58,585  51,379  44,851  
N (countries) 44  42  40  
National Identity 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b z b z b z 
Education -.0208 *** -7.77 -.0183 *** -7.15 -.0182 *** -7.00 
Ethnic Homogeneity -.3877 ** -3.36 -.3622 ** -3.18 -.3736 ** -3.23 
Interaction Term: 
Education x Ethnic Homogeneity -.0281 * -2.50 -.0299 ** -2.85 -.0322 ** -3.05 
N (cases) 58,836  51,558  44,963  
N (countries) 44  42  40  
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001 
Table 21: Selected Coefficients from Multilevel Regression of National Pride on Education  
and Ethnic Homogeneity - Slopes and Intercepts of Education Vary Randomly Across  
Countries with Interaction between Education and Ethnic Homogeneity Included 
 
Language Homogeneity 
Table 22 examines the influence of language homogeneity as the contextual variable. The 
results are as predicted for the ethnic component of national identity and for the national identity 
as the combined variable, but mixed and largely not significant for the civic component, even 
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though they still point in the predicted direction. The coefficients are greatest for the ethnic 
component, as the civic component likely weakens the overall national identity results.  
In countries with higher language homogeneity (one or a few prevailing languages; lower 
diversity), more educated people have lower levels of national identity, especially regarding its 
ethnic component than people in countries with greater linguistic diversity. The results for both 
the ethnic and the linguistic homogeneity variables support my hypotheses, based on the split 
labor market theory (Bonacich 1972). In countries with greater linguistic diversity the 
competition within the country, as well as with (possibly educated) immigrants, is more intense. 
This means that educational differences in national identity are largest in more homogenous 
countries. 
The comparisons between the results for the ethnic homogeneity and for the language 
homogeneity as the aggregate variables justify the separate analysis of each of these variables – 
although close, the results are not the same, and while it is common to use various ethno-
linguistic fragmentation indexes, in this particular case two separate variables make more sense, 
because the ethnic and linguistic homogeneity contextual variables do not produce the exact 
same results. 
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Ethnic Component of National Identity 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b  z b  z b  z 
Education -.0361 *** -8.79 -.0324 *** -8.64 -.0315 *** -8.04 
Language Homogeneity -.5574 ** -3.10 -.5418 ** -2.96 -.6176 ** -3.38 
Interaction Term: 
Education x Language 
Homogeneity -.0329 * -2.25 -.0310 * -2.35 -.0304 * -2.23 
N (cases) 56,175  49,204  42,960  
N (countries) 42  40  38  
Civic Component of National Identity 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b  z b  z b  z 
Education -.0058 * -2.53 -.0051 * -2.16 -.0066 * -2.63 
Language Homogeneity -.1267 -1.78 -.1035 -1.46 -.1128 -1.51 
Interaction Term: 
Education x Language 
Homogeneity -.0105 -1.31 -.0090 -1.09 -.0085 -.097 
N (cases) 56,399  49,388  43,076  
N (countries) 42  40  38  
National Identity 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b  z b  z b  z 
Education -.0212 *** -7.71 -.0191 *** -7.10 -.0193 *** -6.92 
Language Homogeneity -.3496 *** -3.49 -.3301 ** -3.29 -.3756 *** -3.72 
Interaction Term: 
Education x Language 
Homogeneity -.0231 * -2.37 -.0217 * -2.29 -.0207 * -2.13 
N (cases) 56,644  49,564  43,185  
N (countries) 42  40  38  
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001 
Table 22: Selected Coefficients from Multilevel Regression of National Pride on Education 
 and Language Homogeneity - Slopes and Intercepts of Education Vary Randomly Across  
Countries with Interaction between Education and Language Homogeneity Included 
 
Religious Homogeneity 
The results for religious homogeneity in Table 23 are inconsistent. Education, on 
average, does lower national identity, but its effect seems to be the same across nations, because 
the interaction terms are not significant. On the individual-level, religiosity consistently increases 
national identity; but on the country level, the religious homogeneity does not suggest clear 
connections. Kunovich (2006) in his analysis of Christianity and national identity in Europe 
stresses that relationships between national identification and religion are complex and 
dependent not only on the number of religions or denominations in a country, but also on types 
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of denominations and other factors. Thus the information my study uses for religious 
homogeneity on the country level appears to be insufficient to fully examine how religious 
homogeneity influences the relationship between education and national identity. 
Ethnic Component of National Identity 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b z b z b z 
Education -.0369 *** -8.71 -.0325 *** -8.35 -.0314 *** -7.73 
Religious Homogeneity .2192 .99 .1982 .86 .1819 .76 
Interaction Term: 
Education x Religious Homogeneity .0086 .49 -.0054 -.34 -.0028 -.017 
N (cases) 57,273  50,247  43,869  
N (countries) 43  41  39  
Civic Component of National Identity 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b z b z b z 
Education -.0058 * -2.59 -.0049 * -2.12 -.0063 * -2.58 
Religious Homogeneity -.0684 -.84 -.0426 -.52 -.0553 -.63 
Interaction Term: 
Education x Religious Homogeneity -.0138 -1.53 -.0153 -1.65 -.0149 -1.52 
N (cases) 57,498  50,432  43,986  
N (countries) 43  41  39  
National Identity 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b z b z b z 
Education -.0216 *** -7.58 -.0190 *** -6.90 -.0190 *** -6.69 
Religious Homogeneity .0610 .48 .0610 .47 .0470 .35 
Interaction Term: 
Education x Religious Homogeneity -.0039 -.33 -.0114 -1.01 -.0100 -.85 
N (cases) 57,743  50,608  44,095  
N (countries) 43  41  39  
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001 
Table 23: Selected Coefficients from Multilevel Regression of National Pride on Education  
and Religious Homogeneity - Slopes and Intercepts of Education Vary Randomly Across  
Countries with Interaction between Education and Religious Homogeneity Included 
Discussion 
In this chapter I examine the influence of education on national identity while 
distinguishing the varied content of the national identity concept – its ethnic and civic 
dimensions, and the national identity as a combined variable. While some scholars approach 
national identity as a homogenous concept, others (Hjerm 1998, Bollen and Medrano 1998, 
Jones and Smith 2001, Kunovich 2009) distinguish its ethnic and civic components. 
Shulman (2002) adds a cultural component, but Kunovich (2009) finds that empirically this third 
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component cannot be confirmed as separate. The literature on the ethnic and civic components of 
national identity acknowledges that education lowers national identity overall, and that educated 
people tend to favor the civic form of national identity over its ethnic form (Bollen and 
Medrano 1998, Jones and Smith 2001, Kunovich 2009). I hypothesized that while education 
should lower the ethnic component of national identity significantly, its effect on the civic form 
of national identity would be weaker, and the negative effect on the overall national identity as a 
combined variable would be stronger than on that of the civic one, but weaker than on that of the 
ethnic one. 
The analytical results support my hypotheses that a) on the micro-structural level higher 
education, on average, lowers national identity across countries, b) on the macro-structural level 
greater economic development and related components of social development decrease national 
identity, and c) on the micro/macro level countries with more advanced economic development 
and higher ethnic and linguistic homogeneity facilitate the negative effect of education on 
national identity. 
The results of the analyses in this chapter are robust and hold for varied sample sizes and 
varied control variables. The results of my analyses are double-checked by running the 
multilevel models with various numbers of cases – Model 1 with Model 2's cases and Model 3's 
cases, respectively. The results do not change substantively. Neither controlling for more 
variables nor smaller samples eliminate the significance of the interaction terms which suggests 
that the results are robust.  
Missing Values 
There are higher levels of missing values my analyses in Chapter IV than in Chapter III. 
The questions on granting citizenship were asked in a more limited number of countries in the 
Page | 89 
Fifth Wave of the World Values Survey. Even with these limitations the number of countries is 
around 40, which is sufficient for multilevel analysis, and the countries are diverse enough for a 
meaningful analysis. Within the number of countries that were surveyed there are not 
extraordinary amounts of missing data, and running the analyses with lower numbers of 
countries and cases does not influence the robustness of the results. 
Theoretical Implications 
Hypothesis 1: The micro-structural hypothesis. The results for the relationship of 
education and national identity confirm the results from Chapter III (with the consideration that 
in this chapter the ethnic and the civic components of national identity are examined separately 
and together). Higher education tends to lower both the ethnic and the civic forms of national 
identity, and their combined form, as well. This negative effect of education is statistically 
significant for all three variables in all three models (of various sample sizes – nine models 
total); however, the coefficients are highest for the ethnic form of national identity, followed by 
the combined national identity, and lowest for the civic form. The results support my hypothesis 
and the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 1. According to many theorists 
(Bonacich 1972, Bollen and Medrano 1998, Inglehart 1970, 1977, 1990, 2008) more educated 
people have lower levels of national identity due to the increase in their cognitive skills, higher 
post-materialist values, and better position to compete on the market of labor. This is especially 
true for the ethnic form of national identity, which is lowered most by the education of 
individuals, as it is related to ascribed characteristics, i.e. ancestry and being born in the country. 
Education might be lowering the civic form the least because this component relates to achieved, 
voluntary (non-exclusionary) characteristics, and people capable of achieving those 
characteristics might pose a certain threat to educated/ high SES people due to their ability to 
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compete. The work of Kunovich (2009), Jones and Smith (2001), Hjerm (1998) and Bollen and 
Medrano (1998) indicates that more educated people favor the civic form of national identity 
over the ethnic forms, and that seems to be the case here, as well. Pehrson and Green (2010) 
describe reactions to immigrants that are more hostile when the ethnic component of national 
identity is considered, but less so when the civic one is. Michael Hechter's (1987, 2000) and 
Miroslav Hroch's (1993) arguments that education increases national identity are not supported. 
Quite possibly it can be true in some countries, but in the cross-national average such effects are 
not discernible other than possibly weakening the negative effects of education. 
Hypothesis 2: the macro-structural hypothesis. On the macro-structural level the results 
are mixed, but my basic hypothesis is supported: aggregate variables related to development and 
democracy (GDP, HDI, and democracy) do, on average, lower national identity. However, the 
coefficients are statistically significant for the ethnic component of national identity and the 
national identity as a combined variable only, and not for the civic component. This is an 
interesting outcome that implies that there is something about the civic form of national identity 
that is not influenced by the levels of the contextual variables in the sampled countries. 
Conceptually, the biggest difference between the ethnic and the civic dimension of national 
identity is that the civic dimension is voluntaristic, and the ethnic one is ascribed. It is plausible 
the residents of the countries in my sample, on average, consider the civic dimension more 
important, and so the aggregate variables do not lower it as much as the ethnic dimension. The 
outcomes for the combined national identity variable then reflect this pattern. This reasoning is 
in agreement with Kunovich (2009) who finds that higher economic development and democracy 
lead to higher values of the civic dimension of national identity, even as both of these country-
level variables lower national identity overall. Jones and Smith (2001) come to the conclusion 
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that economic development lowers national identity, but that more development also means 
higher civic forms of national identity.  
Similar patterns as for the economic development, human development, and democracy 
can be seen also for secularity, self-expression, ethnic homogeneity, and linguistic homogeneity. 
These contextual variables' coefficients all show as statistically significant and lowering the 
ethnic and the combined dimensions of national identity, but not its civic component. These 
results follow previously cited literature, for example Inglehart (1970, 1977, 1990, 2008) for the 
secularity and self-expression. As Inglehart theorizes, national identity is a traditional value that 
is lower in more secular countries and in countries where people strive for self-expression and 
not solely for material survival any more. People living in countries that are ethnically and 
linguistically less diverse (i.e., have higher homogeneity) have lower ethnic component of 
national identity and national identity overall, perhaps because, as Bonacich (1972) suggests, 
they do not experience as much competition for resources from varied ethnic and linguistic 
groups. 
Religious homogeneity does not significantly affect national identity. I see the main issue 
with religious homogeneity as an aggregate variable to be the lack of information on the type of 
religions in each country and relative incomparability of the effects of various religions on 
people's values. To explain, religions and spiritual outlooks definitely influence people's values, 
opinions, and behaviors, but the mere information on a number of religions present in a country 
cannot account for all their effects. On an individual-level, religiosity is statistically significant in 
lowering national identity consistently in all models; but on a country level, the number of 
religions does not provide enough information. As previously noted, this result agrees with 
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Kunovich's (2006) study on the effect of religions in European countries on national 
identification. 
In a trial multilevel run that included all contextual variables except HDI (that is too 
highly intercorrelated with GDP) the most consistent statistically significant effects are shown 
for linguistic homogeneity, secularity, self-expression (all three for the ethnic component of 
national identity), democracy and self-expression (civic), and democracy, linguistic 
homogeneity, and secularity (for the national identity combined). All of the coefficients are 
negative, except for the civic form and self-expression. Obviously, there are issues with 
multicollinearity in the equation containing all second-level variables, but it is interesting to look 
at these relationships at least in a cursory way. 
Hypothesis 3: The micro/macro hypothesis. On the micro/macro level the GDP, and the 
ethnic and linguistic homogeneity are most consistent in facilitating the negative effect of 
education on national identity (on all three dependent variables for the ethnic homogeneity, and 
on the ethnic component and the combined national identity variables only for the GDP and the 
linguistic homogeneity), and the results for the rest of the contextual variables are mixed. To 
summarize: 
GDP: GDP facilitates the negative effect of education on the ethnic component of 
national identity and for national identity as a combined variable. This result means that more 
educated people in richer countries have lower national identity than educated people in poorer 
countries. This finding is consistent with Ronald Inglehart's (1970, 1977, 1990, 2008) theoretical 
framework on values. In richer, typically more developed, countries more educated people do not 
care as much about traditional values of which national identity is one expression. Insofar as the 
differences between ethnic and civic dimensions of national identity go, the ethnic dimension can 
Page | 93 
be considered as the more traditional of the two, drawing overwhelmingly on history, collective 
memory and tradition, while the civic dimension reflects more modern conceptions of state-
defined national identity that came to be with the rise of the industrial society and modernism. 
Human Development Index: For the Human Development Index the results are 
inconsistent. The interaction terms are not significant in models for any of the three dependent 
variables (the ethnic component, the civic component, and the national identity overall). In other 
words, the HDI does not facilitate the negative effect of education on national identity (even 
though on the macro-structural level the Human Development Index lowers national identity for 
the ethnic and the combined variables). The items that the HDI is composed of seem to dilute the 
additive effect of the GDP on national identity. 
Democracy: Democracy as a contextual variable exhibits mixed results. In two out of 
three models for the national identity as a combined variable the interaction terms are significant 
but not for the ethnic or the civic components separately. More educated people in more 
democratic countries (than in countries with lower levels of democracy) have lower levels of 
national identity overall, but they do not seem to care for the distinction between the ethnic and 
the civic forms of it. 
Secularity and Self-Expression: The results for these value-related variables are mixed. 
The interaction terms are mostly not significant, except in one case: the self-expression on the 
country-level facilitates the negative effect of education on the civic component of national 
identity. This result indicates that in countries with higher levels of self-expression more 
educated people have lower levels of the civic form of national identity than people in countries 
with lower self-expression levels (typically poorer, less-developed countries). 
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Ethnic Homogeneity: Ethnic homogeneity facilitates the negative effect of education on 
national identity in eight out of the nine models considered for the three dependent variables. 
More educated people in more ethnically homogenous countries (less ethnically diverse) have 
lower levels of national identity than educated people in more diverse countries. An argument 
can be made that in such countries more educated people possibly face greater competition for 
resources (status, power, economic opportunities) since there are more ethnic groups that can 
include educated elites, and/or educated immigrant groups resulting from the "brain drain" 
processes. This type of a speculative argument resonates with the theories of Miroslav Hroch 
(1993) about nationalist processes in countries with several ethnic groups, and with Edna 
Bonacich's split labor market theory (1972). 
Linguistic Homogeneity: Linguistic homogeneity results exhibit similar, but not 
identical, characteristics as the results for the ethnic homogeneity. The interaction terms are 
significant for the ethnic component and for the national identity overall, but not for its civic 
component. Since in many (albeit not all) countries the ethnic and the linguistic make-up of the 
population are closely related, theoretical connections mentioned in the preceding paragraph also 
apply here. 
Religious Homogeneity: On the country-level the religious homogeneity variable does 
not exhibit clear connections with national identity, nor does it significantly influence the 
relationship between education and national identity. Similarly to Kunovich (2006) I am not able 
to determine these processes solely from the information on the number or religions without 
additional information. 
The main limitation of the analysis in this Chapter is, similarly to Chapter III, the limited 
number of countries in my sample because for financial and logistical reasons not all countries 
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are included in the World Values Surveys. On the other hand, no other study I am aware of has 
as many countries in its sample as mine does. The World Values Survey's batteries of items 
relevant to the ethnic and the civic dimensions of national identity were asked in 45 countries in 
its fifth wave out of approximately 195 countries in the world (Department of State 2011). 
Conclusion 
This chapter of my dissertation shows how different components of national identity 
(ethnic and civic) and national identity in general are influenced by micro-structural and macro-
structural factors. To examine these relationships in detail I use dependent variables that are 
different from the dependent variables used in Chapter III. 
The results of the analyses in Chapter IV confirm the results from Chapter III, but also 
deepen the understanding of the conceptual relationships that exist between national identity, 
education, and various contextual (country-level) factors. Education lowers both ethnic and civic 
components of national identity, and this influence is more pronounced for the ethnic 
component, and for national identity overall. The civic component is not as strongly negatively 
influenced because per existing literature (Bollen and Medrano 1998, Jones and Smith 2001, 
Kunovich 2009) more educated people favor the civic component over the ethnic one.  
On the micro/macro level the clearest and strongest results pertain to the aggregate 
variable of ethnic homogeneity – the statistically significant results for all three dependent 
variables show that in countries that are less diverse ethnically, more educated people have lower 
national identity in general, and also have lower the ethnic and civic components of national 
identity than more educated people in countries that are more ethnically diverse.  
The facilitating effect is consistent across all analytical models used. This result supports 
Bonacich's (1972) split labor market theory and Hroch's (1993) theories on the emerging 
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minority elites. Both of these theoretical frameworks point to the importance of labor market and 
power competition on the level of the educated groups in society. Linguistic homogeneity has 
similar, although not identical, effects – the exception being the civic form of national identity 
which, even though not significant, still points in the predicted direction. This is not an 
unexpected result because in many countries ethnic and linguistic groups are closely related. 
However, the slightly differing results indicate that the decision to study the two characteristics 
separately, and not as one index, was the correct one. 
Economic development has an additive effect on the negative influence of education on 
national identity, as well, but it is only statistically significant for the ethnic component and for 
the national identity overall. More educated people in richer countries have lower national 
identity than more educated people in poorer countries. Although the results for the civic form of 
national identity are not statistically significant, they still point in the predicted direction. 
In closing, the influence of GDP and ethnic and linguistic homogeneity on the 
relationship between education and the varied contents of national identity and on national 
identity in general is predictable across nations. The meaning of national identity is complex and, 
as I have shown, when expressed by different variables, the examination of the complexity can 
tell a more nuanced story on the levels of individuals and countries, and also while examining 
individuals as being part of their respective countries with unique characteristics each.  
Future research would make a fascinating addition to the story of national identity by 
focusing on the role of religion in the complex relationships between national identification and 
contextual variables, especially with a more detailed consideration of the types of religions and 
religious denominations present in individual countries. Kunovich (2006) makes a significant 
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contribution concerning Europe and Christianity, but a large-scale multilevel examination of this 
topic is as of yet missing. 
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CHAPTER V – EXPANDED TEST OF THE THEORY:  
PREFERENCES FOR RESTRICTIVE IMMIGRATION POLICIES 
In the analytical Chapters III and IV I examined the effects of education on national 
identity and found support for my theory. The results are statistically significant and conclusions 
clear, yet a full test of the theory also demands testing of how the results relate to "real" life and 
people's direct behavioral consequences. For example, attitudes toward immigration can directly 
translate general views on national identity into specific policies and political controversies. In 
this chapter I address the effect of education on the preferences for restrictive immigration 
policies. I reason that education influences national identity as described in previous chapters, 
and that education, in extension, also has an effect on people's policy preferences related to the 
national identity issues. Thus the abstract theoretical concepts and results for national identity 
can be extended to a more concrete outcome. 
The World Values Survey contains the following item related to the preferences for 
restrictive immigration policies:  
How about people from other countries coming here to work. Which one of the 
following do you think the government should do? 
a. Let anyone come who wants to? 
b. Let people come as long as jobs are available? 
c. Place strict limits on the number of foreigners who can come here? 
d. Prohibit people coming here from other countries? 
My analyses in this chapter use this item as a dependent variable that expresses people's 
preferences for restrictive immigration policies. The values range from 1 (the weakest preference 
for restrictive policies) to 4 (the strongest preference for restrictive policies). Analytical runs 
analogous to those in the previous chapters are used to examine how education influences 
preferences for restrictive immigration policies, how macro-level (country-level) variables affect 
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these preferences, and how the country-level, or contextual, variables influence (facilitate or 
inhibit) the relationship between education and the preferences for restrictive immigration 
policies.  
The literature on the relationships between education and restrictive immigration policies 
is surprisingly scarce, especially if one considers studies in some way related to national identity. 
Based on my analyses in Chapters III and IV and theoretical framework, I expect that education 
on the micro-, individual, level will influence the preferences for restrictive immigration 
negatively; in other words, that more educated people will favor less restrictive immigration 
policies on average. Empirically, this influence is found, for example, in Quillian (1995) or in 
Kunovich (2009). On the macro- level, where contextual variables enter into the equations, the 
relationships get interesting. Existing literature (Quillian 1995, Hjerm 2003, Pehrson, Vignoles, 
and Brown 2009, Pehrson and Green 2010, and Kunovich 2009) suggests that people in more 
developed countries with higher GDP have, overall, stronger preferences for restrictive 
immigration policies. Following the above empirical studies I expect that preferences for 
restrictive immigration policies will be higher in higher GDP countries. Theoretically, one may 
draw on Blumer's (1958) concept that threat relates to group privileges, and thus groups (nations) 
with greater privileges will feel more threatened by the perceived possibility of losing them to 
immigrants.  
I anticipate that the results for the multilevel models with the cross-level interactions will 
be similar to the results of the cross-level interactions for the national identity variables 
examined in Chapters III and IV. As shown in the theoretical outline for this chapter, attitudes 
toward immigrants are related to national identity and I expect education to have a stronger 
negative effect in richer countries. The test of the interaction hypothesis in this chapter is more 
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stringent than in preceding chapters because, unlike for national identity, the preferences for 
restrictive immigration policies on the macro-structural level are stronger in high income 
countries. 
Results 
Table 24 describes means and sample sizes of the individual and country-level variables 
used in this chapter. 
Variable (Type) N (Indiv.) N (Ctry.) Mean  St. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variable 
Restrictive Immigration Policy 68,193 51 2. 46 .85 1 4 
Independent Variables (Individual Level) 
Marital Status 82,731 57 .63 .48 0 1 
Number of Children 77,692 57 1.92 1.84 0 8 
Financial Satisfaction 78,921 57 5.22 2.47 1 10 
Religiosity 80,039 57 .70 .46 0 1 
Father immigrant 60,501 44 .06 .25 0 1 
Mother immigrant 60,568 44 .07 .25 0 1 
Sex (Male) 82,896 57 .48 .50 0 1 
Age 82,725 57 41.41 16.48 15 98 
Age Squared 82,725 57 1,986.89 1,533.84 225 9,604 
Education 82,408 57 5.25 2.50 1 9 
Employed 79,652 55 .60 .49 0 1 
Savings in the Past Year 72,632 52 2.87 .93 1 4 
Income 74,680 55 4.58 2.31 1 10 
Social Class 68,901 50 2.61 .97 1 4 
Independent Variables (Country Level) 
GDP 82,992 57 16,458.07 13,021.46 1,110 48,393 
Human Development Index (HDI) 79,064 55 807.8 154.36 361 968 
Democracy (composite scale) 81,740 56 5.51 1.68 1.5 7 
Political Rights  
(used for scale creation) 81,740 56 2.54 1.89 1 7 
Civil Liberties 
(used for scale creation) 81,740 56 2.45 1.52 1 6 
Secularity (scale) 81,492 56 -.25 1.01 -1.94 1.96 
Self-Expression (scale) 81,492 56 .10 1.06 -1.68 2.35 
Ethnic Homogeneity 82,992 57 .61 .24 .22 1 
Language Homogeneity 80,265 55 .65 .27 .13 1 
Religious Homogeneity 81,772 56 .54 .24 .14 1 
Table 24: Descriptive Statistics of Individual-Level and Country-Level Variables Used in Chapter V Analysis 
The mean for the dependent variable Preferences for Restrictive Immigration Policies is 
2.46. There are 68,193 cases available for analysis in 51 countries. For the rest of the variables 
the number of countries and the number of cases is the same as in preceding chapters: For 
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independent variables, the variable describing sex has the most cases (82,896), and the GDP has 
the most cases on the contextual level (82,992), both in 57 countries. On level 1, the least 
number of cases is observed for the immigrant status of the father of the respondent (60,501 in 
44 countries), and on level 2 for the Human Development Index (79,064 in 55 countries).  
As previously stated, the analyses are run for three different sets of variables and cases. 
The first model has the most countries and cases, but fewer independent variables. As individual-
level variables are added, the numbers of countries and cases decline because of missing values. 
The first model includes basic demographic variables: sex, marital status, employment status, 
age (and age squared), education (as the independent variable), and satisfaction with the financial 
status of the household in the past year. In the second model the number of children, religiosity, 
and income are added. For the third model savings (or lack thereof), subjectively determined 
social class, and immigrant status of the respondent's parents are also considered. 
To preview, the results of the multilevel analyses support my hypotheses. Education has, 
on average, a negative effect on the preferences for the restrictive immigration policies which 
means that more educated people favor less restrictive immigration policies. On the macro level 
economic development increases the tendency to favor restrictive immigration policies. On the 
micro/macro level GDP and other development-related and values-related variables facilitate the 
negative influence of education on the preferences for restrictive immigration policies. The 
results for the culture-related variables on the country level are mixed. 
Preferences for Restrictive Immigration Policies and GDP 
Table 25 describes the additive results of the multilevel regression of the restrictive 
immigration policies on individual-level characteristics controlling for the GDP. Included in the 
table are unstandardized coefficients that show the change in restrictive immigration policies for 
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a one unit change in a predictor. The z-ratios are used to determine statistical significance at the 
0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels.  
Preferences for Restrictive Immigration Policies 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 b z b z b z 
Sex (Male) -.017 ** -2.71 -.0213 ** -3.12 -.0187 * -2.44 
Married .0065 .91 .0085 1.05 .0147 1.63 
Employed .0049 .66 .0097 1.21 .0103 1.13 
Age .0028 * 2.51 .0028 * 2.25 .0021 1.51 
Age2 -.0000 -1.63 -.0000 -1.68 -.0000 -.83 
Education -.0303 *** -7.13 -.0251 *** -6.14 -.0221 *** -4.57 
Financial Satisfaction .0122 *** 8.99 .0079 *** 5.09 .0079 *** 4.35 
Children   .0024 .96 .0011 .39 
Religiosity   .0296 *** 3.56 .0325 ** 3.46 
Income   -.0114 *** -6.39 -.0063 ** -2.87 
Savings     -.0054 -1.23 
Social Class     -.0256 *** -5.26 
Father Immigrant     -.0701 ** -2.96 
Mother Immigrant     .0141 .60 
Log GDP .1137 ** 2.80 .1109 ** 2.61 .1083 ** 2.45 
Var (_cons) .0878  .0919  .0932  
Var (residual) .5942  .5932  .5826  
N (cases) 63,884  56,311  43,880  
N (countries) 49  47  40  
ICC .1442      
L1 R
2
 .0010  .0110  .0110  
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001 
Table 25: Coefficients from the Multilevel Regression of the Preferences for  
Restrictive Immigration Policies on Individual-Level Characteristics and GDP –  
Slopes and Intercepts of Education Vary Randomly Across Countries 
On the individual level, being male slightly decreases the preferences for restrictive 
immigration policies, as does having higher income and being in higher self-reported social 
class. Having an immigrant father also decreases the restrictive immigration policies. All the 
above mentioned effects are statistically significant. The individual-level variables that increase 
the preferences restrictive immigration policies are being religious and satisfaction with financial 
situation. The results for age are inconsistent although the direction of this relationship is 
positive. One standard deviation increase in education decreases the standard deviation of the 
preferences for restrictive immigration policies by 0.0880. On the macro level, higher GDP 
increases the preferences for restrictive immigration policies.  
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The Intra-Class Correlation Coefficient as a measure of homogeneity indicates that there 
is approximately 14 percent of variation in the preferences for restrictive immigration policies 
and approximately 86 percent can be attributed to variations within countries. The level 1 
r-squared (proportional reduction in individual-level variance) explains how much level 1 
variance is explained by level 1 variables. Although the percentages in the models are small, the 
effects of many of the independent variables are statistically significant.  
Second-Level Variables with Interactions 
Tables 26 through 33 describe the results of the multilevel analyses with the interaction 
terms included. Level 2 variables used are the same as in Chapters III and IV: GDP, HDI, 
democracy, self-expression, secularity, and ethnic, linguistic, and religious homogeneity. The 
interaction terms include education times each of the level 2 variables, but each interaction term 
is added to a separate model. As explained in Chapter III, studying micro/macro structural 
relationship across countries requires not only multilevel models, but also models that include 
cross-level interaction terms to represent differences across countries in the slopes or effects of 
the individual determinants. Different countries have varying levels of GDP, democracy, and 
other macro-structural characteristics. The macro-structural factors can then facilitate or inhibit 
the effect of education on the preferences for restrictive immigration policies. The tables 
illustrate the testing of the hypotheses on the combined micro/macro level about how the 
relationship between education and the preferences for restrictive immigration policies is 
influenced by country-level (aggregate) or, in other words, contextual, factors. The tables 
summarize the results and do not include complete sets of predictors (as shown in Table 25), but 
the models used in the analysis do include all individual variables.  
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The number of cases in the multilevel models range from 42,173 in 38 countries (for 
Model 3 and language homogeneity) to 63,883 in 49 countries (for Model 1 66and GDP and also 
for Model 1 and ethnic homogeneity).  
Detailed Results for Aggregate Variables 
Each aggregate variable's effect is analyzed separately to avoid problems with 
collinearity. 
GDP 
Preferences for Restrictive Immigration Policies 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b z b z b z 
Education -.0296 *** -8.87 -.0251 *** -7.49 -.0221 *** -5.82 
Log GDP .1229 ** 3.03 .1247 ** 2.95 .1249 ** 2.83 
Interaction Term: 
Education x Log GDP -.0175 *** -5.52 -.0154 *** -4.90 -.0173 *** -5.12 
N (cases) 63,884  56,311  43,880  
N (countries) 49  47  40  
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001 
Table 26: Coefficients from Multilevel Regression of the Preferences for Restrictive  
Immigration Policies on Education and GDP - Slopes and Intercepts of Education  
Vary Randomly Across Countries with Interaction between Education and GDP Included 
Education, on average, lowers the preferences for restrictive immigration policies, but 
GDP raises them. This is in agreement with existing literature and my hypotheses. Adding the 
interaction term changes the dynamic somewhat; it seems that even though as a separate macro- 
variable the GDP increases the preferences for restrictive immigration policies, in the cross-
interaction term it actually facilitates the negative effect of education on the preferences for 
restrictive immigration policies. This means that in richer countries more educated people have 
lower preferences for restrictive immigration policies, on average, than more educated people in 
less developed countries. From a theoretical perspective rich countries probably get more 
immigrants, and also the relative difference between the wealth and position of the immigrants 
and the native inhabitants are much larger. Poorer countries likely do not have immigration of 
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similar magnitude as do the more developed countries, the differences between the existing 
population and immigrants might not be as great, and the threat not as pronounced. Education, 
GDP, and their interaction terms are statistically significant in all three models. 
Calculating the predicted levels of the preferences for restrictive immigration policies in a 
country with a GDP of $500 per year and for the GDP of $30 thousand per year yields the 
following results: the negative effect of education on the preferences for restrictive immigration 
policies is 152 percent stronger in richer countries.  
Human Development Index 
Table 27 describes the results of the multilevel analyses with the Human Development 
Index as the aggregate variable. The results are fairly consistent and statistically significant for 
both education and the interaction term, but mixed for the HDI (only in one model out of three is 
the coefficient statistically significant). Again, the same pattern emerges as it did for the GDP – 
education decreases the preferences for restrictive immigration policies, HDI increases them, and 
in the interaction term HDI facilitates the negative effect of education on the preferences for 
restrictive immigration policies. Since HDI includes a substantial economic development 
portion, this is not surprising. The significance of the interaction terms is important since it 
supports the main hypothesis of this dissertation.  
Preferences for Restrictive Immigration Policies 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b z b z b z 
Education -.0286 *** -8.17 -.0240 *** -6.90 -.0211 *** -5.10 
HDI .0006 * 1.96 .0006 1.93 .0006 1.82 
Interaction Term: 
Education x HDI -.0001 *** -4.72 -.0001 *** -4.07 -.0001 *** -3.77 
N (cases) 62,661  55,096  42,676  
N (countries) 48  46  39  
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001 
Table 27: Coefficients from Multilevel Regression of Preferences for Restrictive Immigration  
Policies on Education and Human Development Index - Slopes and Intercepts of Education  
Vary Randomly Across Countries with Interaction between Education and HDI Included 
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Democracy 
The next contextual variable that is considered is democracy. Since economic 
development, human development, and democracy often go hand in hand, I expect the results of 
the multilevel analyses to be similar for this particular variable. Table 28 describes the results. 
Preferences for Restrictive Immigration Policies 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b z b z b z 
Education -.0288 *** -7.33 -.0241 *** -6.27 -.0185 *** -4.31 
Democracy .0277 .96 .0255 .85 .4282 1.23 
Interaction Term: 
Education x Democracy -.0082 ** -3.42 -.0070 ** -3.05 -.0104 *** -3.77 
N (cases) 62,724  55,298  43,880  
N (countries) 48  46  40  
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001 
Table 28: Coefficients from Multilevel Regression of the Preferences for Restrictive Immigration  
Policies on Education and Democracy - Slopes and Intercepts of Education Vary Randomly Across  
Countries with Interaction between Education and Democracy Included 
When examining countries with varying degrees of democracy, the results are similar to 
those for the Human Development Index. The interaction terms point in the predicted direction, 
and are significant. The negative effect of education is significant in all models. Democracy as a 
separate macro-structural variable increases the preferences for restrictive immigration policies, 
but the coefficients are not significant. That means that although the levels of democracy vary 
across countries, these variations do not significantly influence the people’s preferences for 
restrictive immigration policies. The coefficients for the interaction terms are negative and 
significant in all three models and indicate that educated people in more democratic countries 
have lower preferences for restrictive immigration policies than educated people in countries 
with lower levels of democracy. Thus democracy facilitates the negative effect of education on 
the preferences for restrictive immigration policies. 
Secularity and Self-Expression 
Table 29 and 30 describe the multilevel analyses for the values-related level 2 variables, 
secularity and self-expression. Both of them are scales from the World Values Survey data. 
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Preferences for Restrictive Immigration Policies 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b z b z b z 
Education -.0286 *** -7.52 -.0232 *** -6.49 -.0192 *** -4.70 
Secularity .0107 .23 .0158 .34 .0175 .31 
Interaction Term: 
Education x Secularity -.0140 *** -3.78 -.0143 *** -4.21 -.0186 *** -4.51 
N (cases) 62,509  54,980  42,667  
N (countries) 48  46  39  
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001 
Table 29: Coefficients from Multilevel Regression of Preferences for Restrictive Immigration  
Policies on Education and Secularity - Slopes and Intercepts of Education Vary Randomly  
Across Countries with Interaction between Education and Secularity Included 
 
Preferences for Restrictive Immigration Policies 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b z b z b z 
Education -.0297 *** -7.54 -.0250 *** -6.44 -.0214 *** -4.65 
Self-Expression .0068 .14 -.0016 -.03 .0003 .00 
Interaction Term:  
Education x Self-Expression -.0132 ** -3.31 -.0108 ** -2.75 -.0115 * -2.57 
N (cases) 62,509  54,980  39  
N (countries) 48  46  42,667  
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001 
Table 30: Coefficients from Multilevel Regression of Preferences for Restrictive Immigration  
Policies on Education and Self-Expression - Slopes and Intercepts of Education Vary Randomly  
Across Countries with Interaction between Education and Self-Expression Included 
In both tables and all models the coefficients for education are negative and statistically 
significant. The interaction terms are also negative and statistically significant. The contextual-
level variables by themselves (secularity and self-expression) are not significant. The results for 
the cross-interaction terms suggest that the two values-related variables facilitate the negative 
influence of education on the preferences for restrictive immigration policies. In other words, 
higher educated people in countries with higher country-level secularity and self-expression have 
lower preferences for restrictive immigration policies than higher educated people in countries in 
which these values have lower levels.  
Ethnic Homogeneity 
In Table 31, only the coefficients for education are statistically significant, and they are 
negative. That means education, on average, lowers the preferences for restrictive immigration 
Page | 108 
policies. However, ethnic homogeneity (or lower ethnic diversity) does not seem to influence the 
preferences for restrictive immigration policies or to facilitate or inhibit the effects of education. 
People in more diverse or less diverse countries have statistically indistinguishable preferences 
for restrictive immigration policies that are not contingent on the effects of education. 
Preferences for Restrictive Immigration Policies 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b z b z b z 
Education -.0294 *** -7.14 -.0244 *** -6.12 -.0212 *** -4.54 
Ethnic Homog. -.0861 -.45 -.0733 -.37 -.0579 -.26 
Interaction Term:  
Edu x EthnicH. 
-.0321 -1.90 -.0288 -1.80 -.0352 -1.85 
N (cases) 63,884  56,311  43,880  
N (countries) 49  47  40  
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001 
Table 31: Coefficients from Multilevel Regression of Preferences for Restrictive Immigration Policies  
on Education and Ethnic Homogeneity - Slopes and Intercepts of Education Vary Randomly Across  
Countries with Interaction between Education and Ethnic Homogeneity Included 
 
Language Homogeneity 
Table 32 shows the results of the analyses with linguistic homogeneity as the contextual 
variable. The results are mixed: the effect of education is negative and statistically significant in 
all three models, the effect of language homogeneity is not significant, and the results for the 
interaction term are mixed, but mostly not significant. These results are analogous to the results 
for the ethnic homogeneity above, except for Model 1 and linguistic homogeneity in which 
linguistic homogeneity facilitates the negative effect of education on the preferences for 
restrictive immigration policies meaning that in more linguistically homogenous countries more 
educated people have lower preferences for restrictive immigration policies than educated people 
in more diverse countries. 
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Preferences for Restrictive Immigration Policies 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b z b z b z 
Education -.0295 *** -7.09 -.0247 *** -6.07 -.0224 *** -4.76 
Lang. Homog. -.0800 -.048 -.0836 -.49 -.0162 -.09 
Interaction Term:  
Education x Lang. Homog. -.0393 ** -2.63 -.0328 -2.27 -.0430 -2.62 
N (cases) 61,795  54,405  42,173  
N (countries) 47  45  38  
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001 
Table 32: Coefficients from Multilevel Regression of Preferences for Restrictive Immigration  
Policies on Education and Language Homogeneity – Slopes and Intercepts of Education Vary  
Randomly Across Countries with Interaction between Education and Language Homogeneity Included 
 
Religious Homogeneity 
Religious homogeneity is addressed in Table 33. Again, only the effects of education are 
statistically significant, but not the aggregate variable or the interaction term.  
Preferences for Restrictive Immigration Policies 
 Model 1: most countries Model 2: fewer Model 3: fewest 
 b z b z b z 
Education -.0305 *** -7.13 -.0254 *** -6.15 -.0223 *** -4.54 
Relig. Homog. -.0970 -.49 -.0773 -.37 -.1495 -.66 
Interaction Term:  
Education x Relig. Homog. 
.0224 1.26  1.06 .0169 .84 
N (cases) 62,864  55,421  43,063  
N (countries) 48  46  39  
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001 
Table 33: Coefficients from Multilevel Regression of Preferences for Restrictive Immigration  
Policies on Education and Religious Homogeneity - Slopes and Intercepts of Education Vary  
Randomly Across Countries with Interaction between Education and Religious Homogeneity Included 
The ethnic, linguistic, and religious homogeneity variables are all culture-related 
variables. The results of the analyses overall indicate that the relationship between education and 
the preferences for restrictive immigration policies is not contingent on these cultural factors. 
The effect of education is significant and negative, but it seems to be identical across nations.  
The results of the analyses in this chapter are robust and hold for varied sample sizes and 
varied control variables. The results are double-checked by running the multilevel models with 
various numbers of cases (casewise) – Model 1 with Model 2's cases and Model 3's cases, 
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respectively. The results do not change substantively. Neither controlling for more variables nor 
smaller samples changes the significance of the interaction terms. 
Missing Values 
There are somewhat higher levels of missing values in my analyses in Chapter V than in 
Chapter III, but lower than in Chapter IV. The questions on the preferences for restrictive 
immigration policies were asked in a more limited number of countries in the Fifth Wave of the 
World Values Survey. Even with these limitations the number of countries is around 40, which is 
more than sufficient for multilevel analysis, and the countries are diverse enough for a 
meaningful analysis. Within the number of countries that were surveyed there are not 
extraordinary amounts of missing data, and running the analyses with lower numbers of 
countries and cases does not influence the robustness of the results. 
Discussion 
In this chapter, I examined the influence of education on the preferences for restrictive 
immigration policies as a concept related to the previously covered topics of national identity 
that is current, relevant to people's everyday lives, and hugely influential in terms of political 
ideology and voting patterns. I hypothesized that higher levels of education would lower the 
preferences for restrictive immigration policies and that on the level of countries higher GDP 
would increase the preferences for restrictive immigration policies. I further expected that the 
GDP would facilitate the negative influence of education on the preferences for restrictive 
immigration policies. Based on the results from my own research in Chapters III and IV I 
assumed the effects of education on the preferences for restrictive immigration policies would be 
influenced by other contextual variables. The hypotheses have not been tested before and any 
similar studies have not been done on the same, worldwide scale. 
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Hypothesis 1: The microstructural hypothesis. The results of the analyses in this chapter 
support my hypothesis that education lowers the preferences for restrictive immigration policies. 
Education has, on average, a negative effect on the preferences for restrictive immigration 
policies across countries. This finding is in line with existing literature even though many of the 
studies cited use variables or methods different from mine. Quillian (1995) examines prejudice 
against immigrants in European countries and reports that prejudice decreases with increased 
education. It logically follows that people with more prejudice against immigrants would have 
increased preferences for restrictive immigration policies. One of the results of 
Kunovich’s (2009) study was that more educated people have lower national identity, and that 
less educated people have higher levels of national identity. Increased national identity is then 
linked to more restrictive views on immigration. Pehrson, Vignoles, and Brown (2009) state that 
education has a significantly negative relationship with anti-immigrant prejudice. Thus the 
results of my analyses confirm the overall viewpoints of the existing literature. 
Hypothesis 2: The macro-structural hypothesis. On the macro-structural level my 
hypotheses are supported for GDP. I expected GDP to affect the preferences for restrictive 
immigration policies positively and my analyses support this expectation. The results for the rest 
of the level 2 variables are either mixed (for linguistic homogeneity) or not statistically 
significant. 
In this context, it is appropriate to mention Blumer (1958) who considers prejudice a 
response to a threat to a dominant racial or national group. Given that the dominant group in 
society usually sets the political tone of a country (except, perhaps, at times of revolutions), such 
group might be threatened by immigration, for example, when there is an influx of educated 
immigrants (as during brain drain) or when cheap immigrant labor increases competition on the 
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corporate level by pushing profits down. Pehrson and Green's (2010) multilevel European study 
shows that threat that is perceived by the native population from immigrants is higher in 
countries with higher GDP. Similarly, Pehrson, Vignoles, and Green (2009) study anti-
immigrant prejudice in 31 countries using the International Social Survey Programme and find 
that in higher GDP countries there is more prejudice based on national identification than in 
lower-GDP countries. Hjerm (2003) reports stronger xenophobia in Western (more developed) 
Europe than in Eastern European countries, even though he does not directly analyze any 
economic factors, but focuses on culture and the content of nationalist sentiments. 
Quillian (1995) examines prejudice against immigrants in Europe and shows that prejudice 
varies with perceived threat that he relates on the collective level to economic conditions in a 
country. In better economic conditions the perceived threat is greater and anti-immigrant 
prejudice stronger.  
In a test run with all level 2 variables included, secularity and linguistic homogeneity 
show as the only ones that are statistically significant. These are results very similar to the 
analogous run in Chapter IV. Even though in such analysis there are, obviously, issues with 
collinearity, one may speculate that in a different research project there can be interesting 
discoveries made with regard to these variables. 
Hypothesis 3: The micro/macro hypothesis. On the micro/macro level the GDP, HDI, 
and democracy most clearly and consistently facilitate the negative effect of education on the 
preferences for restrictive immigration policies. The interaction terms are negative and 
significant in all models for these three variables. More educated people in more developed, 
richer countries favor less restrictive immigration policies. This result is consistent with 
Kunovich (2009) and holds up even when rerunning the analyses while controlling for national 
Page | 113 
pride. Including national pride in the equations for this chapter does not noticeably change the 
results otherwise. 
Secularity and self-expression also facilitate the negative influence of education on the 
preferences for restrictive immigration policies. In more secular countries and countries with 
higher levels of self-expressions more educated people’s the preferences for restrictive 
immigration policies are lower; in other words, they also favor less restrictive policies. Such 
countries are often economically developed, and so this result is not surprising, given what the 
analyses including variables related to development suggest.  
Ethnic Homogeneity, Linguistic Homogeneity, and Religious Homogeneity. Diversity 
related variables do not show statistical significance in the interaction term with education except 
for one model and linguistic homogeneity. This result supports the results of Chapter IV analyses 
regarding the effects of education on linguistic homogeneity (although in the present chapter the 
results for ethnic homogeneity are not statistically significant, they point in the same direction). 
Drawing on Blumer (1958), Bonacich (1972), and Quillian (1995), one might conclude that more 
educated people as a group have more to lose with increased immigration in more diverse 
countries because they compete not only with some of the (more educated) immigrants but also 
with various ethnically and/or linguistically diverse groups in their own country, some of which 
might be members of the emerging minority elites (Hroch 1993).  
The main limitation of the analysis in this Chapter is, similarly to Chapters III and IV the 
limited number of countries in my sample. The World Values Survey's “preferences for 
restrictive immigration policies” item was asked in 51 countries in its fifth wave out of 
approximately 195 countries in the world (Department of State 2011). The number of countries 
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and cases included in the analyses in this chapter is thus higher than the number of countries 
included in the analyses in Chapter IV, but lower than in Chapter III. 
Conclusions 
The analytical results support my hypotheses: As expected, on the micro-structural level, 
increased education, on average, decreases the preferences for restrictive immigration policies 
across countries. On the macro-structural level, GDP increases the preferences for restrictive 
immigration policies. On the micro/macro level, greater economic development and some other 
contextual variables facilitate the negative influence of education on the preferences for 
restrictive immigration policies. Consequently, the influence of this group of variables (GDP, 
HDI, democracy, secularity, and self-expression) on the relationship between education and 
restrictive immigration policies can be predicted across nations. The analyses included in this 
chapter support my theory and the results of related empirical studies. Moreover, I have shown 
that results of research based on largely abstract theoretical principles can be acutely relevant to 
people’s everyday lives. 
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CHAPTER VI ‒ CONCLUSION 
Overview 
In my dissertation I set out to examine the relationship between education and national 
identity in varied economic and societal context across the countries of the world. Although 
existing literature overwhelmingly assumes that higher levels of education in individuals lower 
national identity, this is not true everywhere. Prior theoretical framework points out that 
education can either decrease or increase national identity. A prominent example of the latter 
situation would include nationalist movements of the past led by educated individuals and groups 
of people; in a more contemporary setting a telling illustration may be the emergence of the Arab 
Spring in which the movements referred to national quests for greater freedom as their main foci 
and were led by young, educated people with little hope for the future under conditions 
prevailing at the time.  
I worked with theoretical perspectives on the micro- and macro-levels, and I added an 
integrated micro/macro theory on how the relationship between education and national identity is 
contingent on various country-level variables. I focused on contextual variables related to 
economic development, social development, and democracy, and also included values-related 
and culture-related variables that could influence national identity independently of the economic 
conditions. 
I employed a multilevel approach that deepened and more accurately explained the 
dynamics of the relationships between education and national identity, and the societal-level 
factors that influence it across the countries of the world. My goal was to not only investigate the 
important topic of how education influences national identity across different countries and come 
up with new theoretical concepts that were then supported by my analytical results, but also to 
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bring attention to the possibilities of practical applications of the results to people’s everyday 
lives – their preferences for immigration policies that can affect ideology, politics, and voting 
behavior. 
Based on the above outlined theoretical perspectives and practical goals I designed my 
study to include analyses with several different dependent variables. I divided the analyses into 
three analytical chapters: Chapter III describes the results of the examination of the effects of 
education on national identity expressed as national pride, Chapter IV focuses on the different 
dimensions of the content of national identity, and Chapter V considers the related topic of the 
preferences for restrictive immigration policies as one of the more practical applications of the 
abstract analytical examinations of the relationship between education and national identity in 
varied national contexts. I used multilevel modeling and the fifth wave of the World Values 
Survey (2005-2008) to test my hypotheses. There have not been any studies to date on the same 
or similar topics that would have used a dataset of this size and with as many diverse countries 
on different stages of development and/or used multilevel modeling for the investigation of the 
relationship between education and national identity across the world. 
On the micro- , individual, level, I engaged an approach that suggested an inverse 
relationship existed, on average, between education and national identity (see Deutsch 1944, 
Bonacich 1972, Inglehart 1970, 1977, 1990, and 2008, and Bollen and Medrano 1998). My 
results support the framework of these theorists. On the individual level more educated people 
have, on average, lower levels of national identity. This result is consistent with prior studies 
(Bonacich 1972, Bollen and Medrano 1998, Smith and Kim 2006, and Inglehart 2008), and is 
also supported in Chapter IV in which I examined the influence of education separately on the 
ethnic dimension of national identity, its civic dimension, and on national identity as a combined 
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variable. My results follow Kunovich (2009) who finds that the negative effect of education is 
stronger for the ethnic component of national identity than for the civic component; in other 
words, more educated people favor the civic form of national identity. In my interpretation of the 
results, I draw mainly on Kunovich (2009), Jones and Smith (2001), Hjerm (1998, 2003) and 
Bollen and Medrano (1998). I speculate that education has a weaker effect on the civic form of 
national identity because the civic component is considered voluntaristic, non-exclusionary, and 
achievable. Following the cognitive skills theory and related viewpoints (Bonacich 1972, Bollen 
and Medrano 1998, and Inglehart 1970, 1977, 1990, and 2008) I reason that more educated 
people have higher cognitive skills and are also more aware that people (immigrants and 
members of in-country minority groups alike) capable of gaining skills related to the civic form 
of national identity might pose higher threat to the educated people on the labor market. 
While conceptualizing the other theoretical direction of the influence of education on 
national identity where education has a positive effect I drew on the work of Michael Hechter 
(1987) and Miroslav Hroch (1993) whose theoretical arguments posit that education increases 
national identity. These arguments are not directly supported by my analytical results when 
averaged across all countries, but it is possible that since both Hechter and Hroch address mainly 
earlier developmental stages of nationalism, the tests need to focus on countries at lower levels 
of social and economic development. The theories may thus receive support when properly 
specifying their domain. 
On the macro, country level, I considered two groups of theories, as well. One group, 
represented by Anderson (1983), Gellner (1983), Smith (1991, 1992), and Hroch (1993) states 
that economic development increases national identity. The second group of theories argues that 
development decreases national identity (Inglehart 1970, 1977, 1990, 2008, Inglehart and 
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Baker 2000, Jones and Smith 2001, and Kunovich 2009). My results support the second 
theoretical framework – people living in countries on higher level of economic development (and 
also those with greater human development and democracy) tend to have lower levels of national 
identity. Economic development, human development, and democracy exhibit the clearest and 
most consistent results overall. The results for the values-related scales (secularity and self-
expression) and for the ethnic, linguistic, and religious homogeneity, although often theoretically 
explainable, at times display mixed results. It is clear that the effects of these contextual 
variables on national identity are more nuanced than the effects of the development-related 
level 2 variables. This finding is not unexpected given the diversity of the countries in the sample 
and it would be more surprising to see uniform results. Generally, my hypotheses are supported 
for the national identity dependent variables with some exceptions for the civic dimension of 
national identity.  
On the micro/macro level of the analysis of the relationships between education and 
national identity, the existing research and theoretical base to draw on was scarce (excluding 
theories and empirical studies that contributed only partially to possible explanations; for 
example, Bollen and Medrano 1998, Inglehart 2008, and Kunovich 2009), and I drew out 
arguments that integrated both the micro- and the macro- level theoretical findings and the 
results of existing empirical studies. I hypothesized that economic development, democratic 
political institutions, and cultural homogeneity would shift the influence of education on national 
identity toward the negative. My hypotheses and my theory are supported by the analytical 
results of my research. On the integrated micro/macro level GDP facilitates the negative effect of 
education on national identity. This means that more educated people in richer, typically more 
developed countries have lower national identity than more educated people in poorer countries. 
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The results are most consistent for the national identity expressed as national pride variable and 
for level 2 variables related to economic development, human development, and democracy. 
Clearly the level of development and associated characteristics constitute decisive forces in 
shaping how people’s individual characteristics influence national identity. Secularity and self-
expression show mixed results overall but the results are theoretically and empirically justifiable. 
Both variables are scales reflecting the divisions between traditional and non-traditional values 
(Inglehart 1997, Inglehart and Baker 2000). However, the secularity scale likely does not capture 
the complexity of religiosity and its relationships to national identity, nor does religious 
homogeneity. As Kunovich (2006, 2009) notes there are many more factors that the examination 
of the influence of religion would need to include, for example types and relative sizes of 
different religions or religious denominations (depending on country). The role of religion in 
national identification is extremely important but not fully approachable within the scope of my 
dissertation. 
Educated people in countries with higher levels of self-expression tend to have lower 
levels of national identity. Although self-expression is also a values-related scale, it is easier to 
see the link to national identity as a concept more closely aligned with less traditional values than 
the secularity scale. 
Ethnic and linguistic homogeneity exhibit consistent, although not identical, results. In 
ethnically more homogenous countries higher educated people have lower levels of national 
identity than in more diverse countries where competition increases group identification and 
cohesion. Analogously, the negative effect of education is also stronger in linguistically 
homogenous countries, supporting the work of Bonacich (1972), and Jones and Smith (2001). 
Thus educational differences in national identity are largest in homogenous countries.  
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These findings support my hypotheses. The significance and theoretical contribution of 
the results lies in the fact that so far literature on nationalism and national identity has not 
presented a coherent theoretical framework that would explain the effects of education on 
national identity in varied national contexts. My study explores the dynamics of the effects of 
education on national identity in greater depth and shows that the effects can be predicted cross-
nationally. The results are robust and hold for different sample sizes and for models with 
differing sets of variables.  
Although Ronald Inglehart (2008) does not use multilevel modeling to support his 
theoretical assumptions, my results fit well within his general theoretical framework. National 
pride and national identity as materialist values are assumed to be lower in societies on higher 
levels of economic development. Since, according to Inglehart, rising development causes value 
shifts in societies from traditional, materialist values to less traditional, post-materialist values, 
and similar process applies when individuals gain greater levels of education, the additive effect 
of higher development facilitates the lower levels of national identity for people with higher 
education in more developed countries. Corresponding results are shown when the ethnic and the 
civic dimensions of national identity are examined separately. More educated people have lower 
national identity overall in more developed countries. The effects are the clearest and strongest 
for the ethnic component of national identity and for national identity as a combined variable. 
After examining the effects of education on national identity using several dependent 
variables within different analytical models and having my hypotheses confirmed I expanded the 
testing of my theory to include characteristics that can be more directly applicable to people’s 
everyday lives and perhaps more approachable than abstract theoretical conclusions in and of 
themselves. Attitudes toward immigration are an important facet of current political landscape all 
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over the world, and they directly and indirectly relate to national identity. Thus I chose the 
preferences for restrictive immigration policies as a dependent variable for the closing chapter 
which enabled me to examine the influence of education on immigration policies while keeping 
the same expected direction of the relationship as in the earlier chapters. I speculated that people 
with more pronounced sense of national identity would have higher preferences for restrictive 
immigration policies (which signified leaning more toward traditional values than preferences 
for unrestricted immigration). The micro, macro, and micro-macro hypotheses should thus 
extend to immigration outcomes as they did for national pride and national identity outcomes. 
The findings from analyses related to the restrictive immigration policies are interesting. 
On the micro-structural level, education, on average, lowers the preferences for restrictive 
immigration policies. On the macro-level education actually increases preferences for restrictive 
immigration policies overall. This result, although somewhat counterintuitive, is in line with 
existing research (Quillian 1995, Hjerm 2003, Pehrson, Vignoles, and Brown 2009, Pehrson and 
Green 2010, and Kunovich 2009); however, the existing literature does not convincingly 
interpret this finding and in many cases the authors only comment on the surprising nature of it. 
Drawing on my own research and theoretical knowledge I suggest that the preferences for 
restrictive immigration policies are higher in more developed countries because groups (nations) 
with greater advantages and privileges feel more threatened by what they perceive as a possible 
loss of these advantages by increased immigration. This concept can be found, for example, in 
Blumer (1958) and in Bonacich (1972), even though Bonacich refers predominantly to ethnic 
and racial minority groups rather than nations and Blumer talks about groups in general. 
On the micro/macro level, GDP and other development and values-related variables 
facilitate the negative influence of education on the preferences for restrictive immigration 
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policies. The testing of the hypotheses on this level is particularly stringent because of the 
unusual effect of the GDP on the preferences for restrictive immigration policies on the macro 
level as noted in the preceding paragraph. On the micro/macro level the statistically significant 
facilitating effect of GDP on the negative effects of education on the preferences for restrictive 
immigration policies is well supported. More educated people in more economically developed 
countries favor less restrictive immigration policies. The results also hold for more educated 
people in more secular countries and in countries with higher levels of self-expression. 
Overall the examination of the preferences for restrictive immigration policies as related 
to education and contextual variables on the country-level extends my research of national 
identity into a new theoretical and empirical territory and illustrates one of the possibilities for a 
more pragmatic, yet highly systematic and methodical, approach to the issues of national identity 
and nationalism. Together with the analyses of my central hypotheses on the influence of 
education on national identity under varied national contexts it represents an original, integrated 
theoretical and methodological framework that expands current knowledge in the field 
substantially and sets a new foundation to build on for years to come. 
Limitations 
The main limitation of my study is the fact that not all countries of the world participate 
in the World Values Surveys, and for those who do, not every question is asked in every country 
which limits the number of countries available for analysis. Thus out of the 195 independent 
states in the world (Department of State 2011) the data for my analysis was available for 57 
countries. The countries are not randomly selected. Detailed examination of the World Values 
Survey’s website and the Survey’s history reveals that most of the countries that have been 
participating in the survey have been self-selected and have financed their own research under 
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the guidance of the World Values Survey’s Executive Committee in return for getting data on the 
rest of the countries in the Survey (World Values Survey 2012). From time to time the Executive 
Committee decides that countries with certain characteristics need to be added to the Survey, for 
example Islamic countries, in which case the Committee subsidizes some or all of the cost for the 
desired countries to participate. Nevertheless, the sample of countries available for my research 
is large, diverse, and includes varied regions of the world.  
Although the majority of the samples in the World Values Survey are representative on 
basic variables (and the official brochure on the main website for the World Values Survey says 
they are all representative,) the World Values Survey allows quota sampling when full 
probability samples would be too expensive to obtain (World Values Survey 2011a). However, 
there is no comprehensive list of countries and waves in which quota sampling was used. There 
is not a prohibitive amount of missing data in my sample and my research design allowed for 
several redundancies in the way the analyses were run.  
The statistical package that I used, STATA 11, has been very recently replaced with a 
new version, STATA 12. STATA 12 now allows to run the xtmixed command for the multilevel 
analysis with the probability weights included which I could not do at the time, but I did rerun 
the majority of the analyses as multiple regressions with weights and the results were virtually 
identical. I also made casewise runs to ascertain that the results were robust enough and did not 
vary with different numbers of countries and cases or with adding or removing variables or 
groups thereof. 
The measures I used in my research are not unusual or exceptional methodologically and 
have been used routinely in prior studies. The measure of education as the main independent 
individual-level variable has nine ordered categories and although educational systems are 
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different in different countries and the meaning of levels of education can also differ I have not 
detected any criticism of it in the vast existing literature utilizing the World Values Survey. In 
my own personal and empirical experience the categories express the levels of education 
available around the world as accurately as possible considering the variety of countries 
included. 
I used several measures for national identity. A detailed overview is in the Methods 
chapter of this dissertation (Chapter II). Several of my scales contain only two or three items and 
that can be an issue regarding reliability. However, Cronbach’s Alphas for the scales were 
moderate to high which indicated the reliability was not low. DeCoster (2005) reports that when 
a less-reliable scale produces statistically significant results it attests to even stronger effects in 
the analysis. All level 2 variables have been used extensively in prior research. I do not see any 
major issues with any of the measures I used throughout. 
While quantitative data analysis is more explicit than qualitative methods, it does have 
limitations, the main one being the loss of richness in meaning, the “whys” and “how” of 
people’s behavior. There would be no feasible way to examine the concepts that I covered in my 
dissertation on the same scale using qualitative analysis, but it would be possible to follow up on 
some of my discoveries using different methods. I outline some of my ideas for future research 
next. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
The results of my analyses focusing on the influence of education on national identity in 
varied national contexts are robust and my hypotheses are supported. Analyses using several 
differently operationalized measures of national identity confirm my central hypothesis that the 
negative influence of education on national identity is facilitated by greater economic 
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development, i.e. more educated people in more developed, typically richer countries have lower 
national identity than more educated people in poorer countries. The relationship between 
education and national identity is also contingent on other country-level variables, and although 
theoretically explainable, more multilevel research is definitely needed to tease out the nuances 
related to variables representing cultural differences like ethnic, linguistic, or religious 
homogeneity/diversity. Even though some comparative studies exist, world-scale multilevel 
research has yet to be done. Kunovich (2006) initiated such research on a smaller scale in Europe 
with his study on the connections between Christianity and other religions as related to national 
identity, but even he did not get definitive answers on all issues. Multi-regional study would be 
even more complicated and time-consuming. However, combining my and Kunovich’s results 
and research design could streamline the process and provide a framework of methods and ideas 
for future discovery. One of the most interesting points to address in such process would be to 
determine why the influence of religion on national identity is different on the micro- and the 
macro- levels and how to conceptualize level 2 variables for countries with different religions so 
that they would be methodologically approachable using multilevel modeling.  
A related topic that was not possible to address within the scope of this dissertation, 
would be the relationship between gender, education, and national identity in various national 
contexts with special attention to religion (per above paragraph) and nationalist movements. 
Males seem to have higher levels of national identity overall in my study, and, according to, for 
example Fagerlind and Saha (1989), higher levels of education and leadership roles in most 
national movements, as well. On the other hand, gender egalitarianism is spreading throughout 
the world and can over time influence the issues covered in my dissertation. Additional research 
could examine the structuralist-leaning theories of Chafetz (1990) and Collins et al. (1993) that, 
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although dealing at the most with national-level concepts, would not be difficult to extend and 
adjust to global levels of inquiry. 
In addition to expanding and continuing multilevel analysis on the national identity-
related topics I would also recommend using historical-comparative perspectives and in-depth 
analyses on issues that the multilevel models could not approach in sufficient detail, for example 
how sizes and types and characteristics of immigrant groups influence national identity on 
regional levels (for groups of countries).  
One of the main concepts in the literature of nationalism and national identity that I drew 
on during the course of this dissertation is that nationalistic feelings are connected to the rise of 
the modern nation-state and that education in various forms (mass, public, accessible to non-
dominant ethnic groups, supported by print, and others) is one of the most important conditions 
in that process. Education also influences national identification after the nation-state is created 
and developed. Further, one of the premises of my central argument was that in countries on 
different levels of development (economic, political, and cultural) education influences national 
identity in different ways that are contingent on country-level (macro-structural) characteristics. 
The quantitative analyses performed on two levels of data support my argument. However, as 
with any research project, there is always more information to gain. The results, although overall 
supportive of my new theory, do show irregularities. Future research could concentrate on 
clarifying what the outliers are for different societal contexts and countries and attempt to 
explain the reasons for the (possible) exceptions. A prime example would be to expand on the 
studies of the concept of the American exceptionalism (Inglehart and Baker 2000) while drawing 
on my new theoretical insights and empirical results. I would also recommend to revisit 
Inglehart’s (1970, 1977, 1990, 1997, and 2008), Inglehart and Baker’s (2000) and Norris and 
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Inglehart’s (2009) studies on societal values and cultural development and compare, in depth, the 
U.S. to other countries in depth with regard to education, national identity, and societal contexts. 
I hope to become a part of such effort. 
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APPENDIX A. SAMPLING PROCEDURES OF THE WORLD  
VALUES SURVEY – RULES FOR PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATORS 
Dear Colleagues, 
As researchers within the WVS network, we all would like to know that the data we use and we 
disseminate to the academic community meet the commonly accepted methodological standards. 
Additionally, it is important for us comparative researchers that the data we obtain from different 
countries are collected using standardized and therefore comparable techniques. In order to 
provide you with the highest quality comparative data possible, we are asking all of our PIs to 
observe the common principles listed below. Following these rules will ensure all of us of the 
reliability of our data. 
I. THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
A. THE COMMON QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. WVS requires the implementation of a common questionnaire fully and faithfully. 
2. The common questionnaire is drafted by the EC in consultation with members of the 
Scientific Advisory Board, PIs, and experts in the field. 
3. Although each wave has its own questionnaire, keeping previously asked questions to 
the extent possible is a major concern so as to make longitudinal analysis possible. 
4. The master questionnaire is drafted in English. 
B. TRANSLATION 
1. PIs are responsible for the translation of the questionnaire into their local language(s). 
2. In any given country, the questionnaire must be translated into all languages spoken 
by at least 15 percent of the population. 
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3. Translated questionnaires must be back-translated into English by someone other than 
the person who did the original translation from English into the local language. 
4. The translated version, the back-translation and the names of the persons who did the 
translations must be sent to the EC for approval before the fieldwork can start. 
5. Whenever a question has been used in previous surveys, the same translation should 
be preserved to the extent possible in order to allow over time comparisons. However, 
obvious and serious errors in translation should be corrected and the EC should be 
warned about these changes. 
C. DEVIATIONS FROM THE ORIGINAL QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. In principle, every question in the original English questionnaire sent by the EC must 
be asked in every survey. In exceptional cases, where a PI feels a question is 
irrelevant or inappropriate for her/his country, s/he may ask the EC for permission not 
to ask that particular question. However, it must be noted that: 
a. The PI willing to omit a question should inform the EC ahead of time and explain 
the reasons for the omission. 
b. No question may be omitted without EC’s written approval. 
c. EC is not allowed to approve the omission of more than a maximum of 12 
questions in any given country. 
2. PIs may add to the questionnaire questions that they think are relevant to their country 
or certain questions may be added at the request of the funding agency. However, 
these country-specific questions must be placed at the end of the questionnaire but 
before the demographics. (The master questionnaire will indicate the exact location.) 
An exception to this rule is granted if the additional question(s) is (are) directly 
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related to a set of questions or battery in the master questionnaire (e.g. additional 
group(s) for the “neighbors battery” or additional institution(s) for the “confidence in 
institutions battery.”) 
II. THE SAMPLE 
WVS requires a complete explanation of proposed sampling procedures BEFORE the start of the 
fieldwork. The sampling plan must be approved by the EC in writing. 
A. METHOD OF SAMPLING 
The preferred method of sampling for WVS surveys is the full probability sample. 
However, recognizing that the very high cost -in terms of finances, manpower and time- 
of full probability samples may prove to be prohibitive in some cases, WVS allows quota 
sampling provided that the following principles are strictly adhered to: 
1. Selection of PSUs must be probabilistic (and preferably PPS). 
2. Selection of first stage clusters within PSUs must be probabilistic (and preferably 
PPS). 
3. Quota sampling should be used only within reasonably small sized clusters that have 
been selected probabilistically. 
Whether the sampling method is full probability or a combination of probability and 
quota, the minimum number of PSUs is 30. A design with less than 30 PSUs is not 
permissible. 
B. SAMPLE SIZE 
The minimum sample size (i.e. the number of completed interviews) is 1,000. However, 
given the fact that in most designs the “effective sample size” (sample size net of design 
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effects) is lower than the actual sample size, larger sample sizes are strongly 
recommended if at all possible. 
C. NON-RESPONSE 
Non-response is an issue of increasing concern in sample surveys. Investigators are 
expected to make every reasonable effort to minimize non-response. More specifically,  
1. In countries using a full probability design, no replacements are allowed. PIs should 
plan on as many call-backs as the funding will allow. 
2. In countries using some form of quota sampling, every effort should be made to 
interview the first contact. In any case, and as indicated below, a full report on non-
responses is required. 
D. COVERAGE 
WVS surveys are required to cover all residents (not only citizens) between the ages of 
18 and 85, inclusive. PI’s can lower the minimum age limit as long as the minimum 
required sample size for the 18+ population is achieved. 
III. INTERVIEWING 
The mode of data collection for WVS surveys is face-to-face interviewing. Other modes (e.g. 
telephone, mail, internet) are not acceptable except under very exceptional circumstances and 
only on an experimental basis. In any case, EC approval in writing is necessary for modes of data 
collection other than face-to-face interviewing. 
IV. PERIOD OF DATA COLLECTION 
Data collection period for the Fifth Wave of WVS is April 1, 2005 through December 31, 2006. 
Fieldwork in a given country may begin as soon as the translated questionnaire and the sampling 
procedures of that country are approved by the EC. However, fieldwork in a given country may 
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not extend beyond 14 consecutive weeks. Surveys with a fieldwork completion date of later than 
December 31, 2006 cannot be included in the Fifth Wave. 
V. SUBMISSION OF DATA AND THE FINAL REPORT 
A. After the completion of the survey, PIs are responsible for turning in a cleaned and 
complete data set to ASEP-JDS as soon as feasible. PIs also agree to answer inquiries by 
ASEP-JDS regarding their data set without undue delay. 
B. Data set must be accompanied by the completed methodological questionnaire (attached) 
and a report of country-specific relevant information (e.g. important political events prior 
to or during the fieldwork, problems particular to that country, and other necessary 
information). 
VI. ACCEPTANCE AND SHARING OF DATA SETS 
No survey that does not fully and completely adhere to the rules described above will be 
accepted. Once a country’s survey is accepted, its PI and her/his colleagues will have full and 
immediate access to all surveys completed as of that date as well as to those that will be 
submitted later. EC is responsible for keeping all PIs informed about the status of all surveys 
(funding, starting date, completion date, acceptance, etc.). 
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APPENDIX B. LIST OF COUNTRIES INCLUDED IN THE WORLD 
VALUES SURVEY, FIFTH WAVE 2005-2008 
Country 
Nat’l Pride 
Mean GDP HDI Dem 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
1. Burkina 3.8057 1382 367 4 
2. Ethiopia 3.6477 1110 872 3 
3. Ghana 3.9204 1652 512 6.5 
4. Mali 3.8840 1273 361 6 
5. Rwanda 3.7748 1135 449 2.5 
6. South Africa 3.7304 10484 678 6.5 
7. Zambia 3.4928 1978 466 4 
Asia 
8. China 2.9371 8511 756 1.5 
9. Hong Kong 2.6232 38156 939 - 
10. India 3.6772 3579 596 5.5 
11. Indonesia 3.3773 5036 723 5.5 
12. Japan 2.7951 29780 956 6.5 
13. South Korea 3.0483 22048 927 6.5 
14. Malaysia 3.6363 17140 821 4 
15. Taiwan 2.6376 25640 - 7 
16. Thailand 3.8392 9406 777 5 
17. Vietnam 3.7985 3477 715 2 
Eastern Europe 
18. Bulgaria 3.1982 9149 829 6.5 
19. Georgia 3.7327 8880 765 5 
20. Moldova 2.7887 3488 712 4.5 
21. Poland 3.5777 12666 871 7 
22. Romania 3.2032 8211 824 6 
23. Russia 3.2546 1241 804 2.5 
24. Serbia 3.3283 7244 817 5.5 
25. Slovenia 3.4593 22856 918 7 
26. Ukraine 2.9584 9195 783 5.5 
Middle East and North Africa 
27. Egypt 3.7142 5708 696 2.5 
28. Jordan 3.7002 5165 764 3.5 
29. Morocco 3.4846 5420 640 3.5 
30. Iran 3.5244 10414 773 2 
31. Iraq 3.7902 4897 - 2.5 
32. Turkey 3.7665 7738 796 5 
South America 
33. Argentina 3.5388 14496 855 6 
34. Brazil 3.1705 9280 805 6 
35. Colombia 3.8843 7127 795 5 
36. Chile 3.5061 16966 872 7 
37. Guatemala 3.8265 5711 691 4 
38. Mexico 3.7736 10546 844 6 
39. Peru - 6401 791 5.5 
40. Uruguay 3.7028 12923 855 7 
41. Trinidad 3.8884 24150 825 5.5 
Western Europe and the West 
42. Andorra 3.2555 35017 930 7 
43. Australia 3.6295  34323 967 7 
44. Canada 3.6637  35332 963 7 
45. Cyprus 3.4413 24075 908 7 
46. France 3.1406 29238 956 7 
47. Finland 3.4900 29761 952 7 
48. Germany 2.8583 30496 942 7 
49. Great Britain 3.4425 31142 947 7 
50. Italy 3.3026 27795 947 7 
51. Netherlands 3.0664 33390 958 7 
52. New Zealand 3.6727 24079 930 7 
53. Norway 3.4172 48393 968 7 
54. Spain 3.5295 31446 949 7 
55. Sweden 3.2923 31979 960 7 
56. Switzerland 3.1996 37302 957 7 
57. United States 3.5810 42683 955 7  
